Brings the branch up to the current base (executor settings, project
skills, Chinese run messages, cloud IDE removal, wish attachments) and
resolves the ten conflicted files, keeping both sides:
- wish-refiner: the tenant's executor settings pick the models first,
then the Copilot model setting; the tenant credential still goes
before the operator's login
- worker providers: executor settings apply, and a run with its own
credential still gets an empty home
- main.ts: Copilot screenshot uploads and wish attachments each keep
their own body limit
- contracts, http, web types: default budget and skill auto-activation,
Copilot and attachment entity kinds, ./text and ./attachments exports
- globals.css: Copilot styles and attachment styles, one after the other
- tests: the canceled-release reason is Chinese; the refiner's default
models have no [1m] suffix, as this branch names them
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cluster never ran Theia or the IDE gateway, so every workspace stayed
"未配置" forever. The feature is gone instead of half-present:
- API: workspace, launch and lifecycle endpoints, the gateway identity and
its internal routes, the dispatcher's workspace provisioning and the
lifecycle worker. Migration 003 deletes stored workspaces and settles
their pending outbox items.
- Provisioner: workspace provisioning and lifecycle for both backends.
- Web: the 云 IDE panel, the launch route, the start-branch picker that
listed IDE branches, and the workspace count on usage.
- apps/ide, infra/oct, dev:ide and the CI job; IDE parts of local k3s,
network policies, RBAC, docs and the architecture diagram.
A wish can still start from a pushed branch through the API (sourceBranch).
Plan files and stored entitlements may still carry maxWorkspaces; it is
accepted and ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Top-level console entry listing skills of every visible project with
project, status and category filters and search; confirm, edit, enable,
disable, delete, import SKILL.md / zip, copy to another project and
export. The project page shows a summary linking there; project settings
gain the auto-activation switch; docs describe the unified skills.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A per-tenant, per-executor settings record (GET /executor-settings,
GET/PUT /executor-settings/:provider, owner/admin, idempotent replace) with
baseUrl, defaultModel, smallFastModel, fallbackModel, timeoutMinutes, askModel
and askFallbackModel. Unset fields keep the operator's configuration.
- defaultModel is pinned at submission below the wish and bundle models.
- smallFastModel, fallbackModel and timeoutMinutes travel in the run context
to the worker; Claude Code gets ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL /
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL and --fallback-model, CodeBuddy the limit.
- baseUrl goes only with the tenant's own key, over HTTPS (plain HTTP only
where plainHttpAllowed), never in production, behind the model proxy or
with the deployment's native Claude account.
- The wish refiner tries the tenant's ask models first.
- The 执行器 page gets an 执行器设置 dialog, also in native-account mode;
model fields (and the agent page's) accept gateway names like
deepseek-flash@latest[1m].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude Code runs with cache reads count toward token budget and easily
exceeded the former 1M default and 10M cap. The default is now 100M
tokens and the maximum allowed cap is 500M.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Provide an end-to-end guide in docs/wishforge-summary.md covering core
platform values, daily usage, 8-stage pipeline architecture, and QA on
common operational scenarios (waiting states, CLI output limits, deploy
key permissions, and AI optimization model fallback).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The cluster's settings come only from the operator inputs kept in
.wishforge/cluster-poc (carried keys, signing key, plans, profiles,
host keys); the Mac's .env.local and service files are no longer read
- restore puts back one of the node's snapshots inside the cluster: the
files are checked against the manifest before anything is emptied, the
backup container restores the database, row counts decide
- Snapshots also keep Fanyu's Runner records
- Remove migrate, the Mac backup copy and its launchd job, and the Mac
public entry (frp gateway) code and manifests
- Mark the Mac operating guides as retired
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Profiles pin each environment: POC (branch poc) and Fanyu (branch dev,
180.76.138.88, droboticflow-fanyu), with their Deployments by UID
- Releases expect every Deployment of their profile; Fanyu's api image
also runs its annotation processor and validator, each rolled back to
its own image
- Bindings may list several projects; each Runner has its own settings
- fanyu-access: least-privilege identity and build-Pod admission policy in
Fanyu's cluster, its token only in the executor and Fanyu's Runner
- projects --replace: delete every project with all it holds, then create
the POC and Fanyu projects, their environments and Runners
- Ship the Runner's public keys in the ConfigMap, not a Mac path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- cluster-poc.mjs: image (in-cluster Kaniko), bootstrap, secrets, apply,
migrate --rehearsal|--final, public HTTPS entry, backup and restore
- One restricted Pod (platform, executor, Runner, PostgreSQL, Temporal,
MinIO, Caddy, backup) listening only on loopback except Caddy
- Protected checks run in per-workspace check Pods; cancellation during
start-up now always removes them
- Daily snapshots on the node (consistent dump with row counts, Temporal
online backup), copied to the Mac by launchd with SHA-256 checks and a
notification on failure; restore verified on the rehearsal copy
- Downloads and uploads survive the Mac's lossy link to the cluster
- Local public entry, evidence isolation labels, acceptance records
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Provide six account types and custom combinations of wish, code review,
release and management permissions, applied on each authenticated request.
- Enforce frontend-only accounts when submitting, answering, widening and
reverting wishes; require every contributor to have full access before
skipping backend code review.
- Gate code review and release decisions by their specific permissions.
- Rework member management to create and edit account types, permissions and
project access, and reflect those permissions throughout the console.
- Update the manual and architecture docs with permission tests and
end-to-end coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the agent of a frontend-only wish asks to change backend code, or keeps
changing it until the repair rounds run out, the run details offer "改为前端和
后端并继续". It answers the wish with allowBackend: the run may change backend
code from the new requirement revision on, the agent reads that the scope
changed, and the timeline records who widened it. Whether a backend change needs
a review still depends on the submitter's backend permission. Only an answer to
a frontend-only wish accepts the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Each wish says whether it may change backend code. A frontend-only wish is told
which paths it must leave alone; a change to them goes back before any check runs,
the platform puts those files back before the repair round, and the control plane
never integrates them. A wish that may change backend code integrates directly for
people with backend permission and waits for a code review otherwise.
- Owners and admins grant backend permission per person on the members page as well
as per project in the project settings.
- AI optimization has its own button for the wish and for the criteria. It writes a
wish of at most three lines (goal, scope, limits), keeps the details in checkable
criteria, and asks only what the person must decide, as choices whose answers join
the wish; suggested criteria are taken one by one.
- Lists, run titles, Feishu cards and pull request titles show a wish's first line;
the run details show the rest.
- Changed paths no longer follow renames, so moving backend code into a frontend
directory counts at both places for code review and for the frontend-only scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Someone deployed the POC api and worker outside WishForge by mutable tags,
and every build then stopped with a raw validation error: the cluster
snapshot only accepted digest-pinned images.
A component running a tag is now of unknown source, as one set by hand
already was: the timeline names the component and its tag, the build makes
it again, and the release needs a person's approval. A release still deploys
digests only; what it replaces may be a tag of the same repository, and such
a release never declares itself rollback-compatible, since what the tag
pointed at may be gone. An image neither pinned nor tagged, or not of the
component's repository, stops the build with a message naming it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The architecture gains the code_review wait and gate, revert runs, Feishu
notifications, wish optimization, the new entities and how the console acts
for a local account; the POC operations guide covers accounts and the bot's
settings; the repository contract notes the review and the revert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One document that walks through the console page by page: core concepts,
how to write a wish, what a run does, what to do when it stops, approvals,
rollback and undo, members and roles, code review, wish optimization,
notifications, and the operator's guide to the local service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
doctor only looked at the local services. A POC run also needs the
cluster API to build and deploy, the Gitea branch to start from and
push to, the public application to accept a release on, the Claude CLI
and room on the disk; when one of them was down, doctor still said
ready, and a wish found out minutes later, at its build.
doctor now checks them read only, without a model call: the cluster's
readiness, the branch head as builds read it and as integration reaches
it over the operator's SSH login, the build commit the application
reports and whether it is the branch head, the CLI's version and the
free space where runs live. A failing one is named with the first line
of its error and makes the report degraded. start does not wait on
them, so a network problem cannot hold up starting the service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A release counted as protected only a file named exactly Dockerfile,
the Node and Python manifests and the .github directory. The local POC
builds its images from Dockerfile.api, Dockerfile.worker and
Dockerfile.drosync-coordinator, and pins Go and Rust dependencies in
go.mod, go.sum and Cargo files: changing any of them was deployed
without approval wherever releases are preauthorized, and so were
changes to .dockerignore, *.dockerfile, Containerfiles and Gitea or
GitLab CI.
The rule now lives in the contracts package. Any Dockerfile or
Containerfile, the build context's ignore list, Compose files, every
dependency manifest and lock file the verifier knows, and the CI
locations need a person; the verifier's notion of a dependency manifest
is the same list. Ordinary source, tests and documents still go
through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A POC release counted, besides what the target branch gained, the
changes since the commit every component runs. Worker and coordinator
keep their images while only web files changed, so they lag behind the
api, and every later release counted again the changes of releases the
api had long deployed: on the POC a run's classification listed the
previous run's test file, and an earlier change to a protected web file
would have asked for approval on every api-only release after it.
A component that keeps its image does not change; the release now
counts the changes since what the api and each component built again
run. pocComponentsToBuild says which commits those are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every POC build left its source archive, about 30 MB, under
~/.local/share/wishforge/poc/builds, and nothing ever removed them;
nothing reads one once its build has ended either.
After a successful build, the archives of other builds older than an
hour are removed. Their build and release records and logs stay, a
build still uploading keeps its archive, and the newest archive remains
for the operator's sandbox check, which uses it by default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A start that found the tenant's execution slots taken was deferred
like a failed delivery, backing off to two minutes between looks. On
the local POC, which allows one run at a time, the next person's wish
could sit for two minutes after the run before it finished or stopped
to wait, and every look left an error line in the log.
Waiting for a slot is ordinary queueing: the dispatcher now looks again
every ten seconds, one small transaction each time, and logs nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a run's change passed its checks but failed one once merged onto
a target branch that moved meanwhile, the agent got a repair round for
it, even when the failure came from commits other people had pushed:
it would change their code, and spend rounds and tokens doing so.
The verifier now runs that check, recording no evidence, on the target
branch alone. If the branch passes, combining the two caused the
failure, and the agent repairs it as before. If the branch fails too
while the commit the run started from passes, the commits pushed since
broke the branch: the run waits on the new reason target_broken, uses
no repair round, and has its own verified change as its checkpoint
again. A run that started from a commit already failing the check may
be its fix, and is repaired as before.
Continuing merges the verified change onto the repaired branch and
checks the merge. An integration that continues reuses the change's own
verification under the same policy instead of repeating the checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Compose and Kubernetes adapters checked a candidate once. A
container that had started but did not listen yet made the request
throw, and the deployment was reported as of unknown state, to be
reconciled by hand; one stray error from the stable entry right after
the switch rolled a healthy release back.
The candidate checks and the checks after the switch are now repeated,
six attempts two to ten seconds apart, as the POC's already were, and
the Runner logs each repeat. A candidate that never answers is
reported as not switched, with the previous release still serving.
A missing address or missing checks are reported at once instead of
being asked again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A release's risk only counted what the target branch gained when the
run integrated. Commits people pushed to the branch directly, and
integrations that were never deployed, went out with the next release
without being classified: an environment preauthorized for automatic
release took a migration or a Dockerfile change pushed straight to the
branch without approval. The POC chose what to rebuild from the same
narrow diff, so worker and coordinator kept running old code; on the
local POC, WishForge had in fact only ever rebuilt the api.
The control plane now gives the verifier the commit of the release the
environment runs, and the classification covers everything between it
and the release, as well as what the integration brought. On the POC,
each deployment records the commit and the image a release put there.
The build plans from that snapshot, the one the release is checked
against: worker and coordinator keep their images only while what they
run differs from the source in web files alone. A component of unknown
source (never deployed by a release, restored by a rollback, or set by
hand, which leaves the annotations stale) is rebuilt, and the release
is marked partial: it needs approval and does not roll back on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The POC build only accepted a source equal to the head of the Gitea
poc branch. Once someone pushed to poc after a run integrated, the
build failed, and so did every continue: a build stopped by a drop of
the link to the cluster could never finish if poc moved meanwhile, and
the run stayed waiting with an error that did not say why.
When poc has moved on, the build now fetches it and requires only that
its history contains the run's commit; it builds that commit and tells
the timeline that the newer commits deploy with a later run. A source
the branch lost to a rewrite is still never built: the run waits on
the repository with POC_SOURCE_REWRITTEN and says to cancel it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The guide placed each generation's working directories under the
repository, where the local provisioner refuses them, and reset local
data by deleting `.wishforge/`, which also removes the local POC's
project binding, sign-in credentials, Runner keys and deployment
receipts.
It now names the default under ~/.local/share/wishforge/runs, says
why WF_LOCAL_RUN_ROOT cannot point into the repository, and resets
only the databases, the run directory and the platform Git
repositories, after stopping the services.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dispatcher read the run, checked that the start it was delivering
was still the pending one, and reserved the execution grant in a later
transaction. A pause and a continue in between enqueued a newer start,
and the older one went ahead anyway: it took the run's execution
generation back and asked the provisioner for a sandbox for a
generation that had already been replaced.
Reserving the grant now checks the pending start again, in the
transaction that takes the generation, and refuses a replaced one with
START_SUPERSEDED. The dispatcher acknowledges such a start without
marking the run as waiting; the newer start proceeds as usual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A build that stopped on an infrastructure fault, like the drops of the
POC's link to its cluster, repeated the whole protected verification
when continued: installation and every check, about two and a half
minutes on the POC, for a commit whose verdict could not change.
When the integrated commit is the verified checkpoint itself, the
verifier now reuses that verification evidence and only restores the
workspace for the build; the timeline says so. The control plane
offers only test and build evidence recorded under the current
protected policy, as a release requires: after the operator changes
the checks, the run verifies again. That also keeps an executor that
continues at the release stage from requesting a release with
evidence the release would refuse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent's file tools are confined to its workspace, and the
workspace holds .git. It could plant .git/config and .gitattributes
there, and the executor then ran trusted git add, diff, bundle and
merge in that workspace to export the checkpoint and start a repair
round. Git honours repo-local configuration for every command and no
environment variable disables it, so a planted clean or smudge filter,
diff or merge driver, core.fsmonitor or sshCommand, an include, or a
url.insteadOf transport rewrite would run as the worker: in the
development host mode, as the operator, outside any sandbox. The
driver names are the agent's to choose, so -c overrides cannot reach
them.
Before the checkpoint and before mergeTarget, .git/config is now
reduced to core basics, remote, branch and extensions, which is what a
clone needs to fetch, merge and bundle; everything else, the planted
drivers and includes among it, is dropped. It is redone each time,
since a paused run's agent could plant again before it resumes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the development host mode, protected checks and dependency
installations ran directly as the operator. They run the agent's code:
a test it wrote could read the home directory's secrets, reach the
network, or plant Git configuration that the trusted Git commands after
it would execute.
With WF_HOST_CHECK_SANDBOX=true they run under Seatbelt instead. File
contents in the home directory are unreadable except the command's own
directory and the paths the operator lists; it may write only there,
in the caches the operator lists and in a temporary directory of its
own, never in a .git directory. Only installations reach the network;
checks may use loopback ports by opt-in, for test suites that start
local servers. The platform's own ports (control plane, Temporal and
its web UI, database, object storage, provisioner, Git service, IDE,
console) stay blocked in any case: the local start lists them from
their configured addresses. Checks get no answer from the keychain,
and a command whose home is the executor's (holding its credentials)
gets a private one. A sandbox that cannot start leaves the run waiting
on infrastructure; verification evidence records checkSandbox.
scripts/check-host-check-sandbox.ts checks all of this on the target
Mac, from outside the sandbox, then runs the POC's installation and
checks sandboxed on a recent droboticflow source. Enabled on the local
POC, a real wish passed through both, including a repair round for the
agent's own failing tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every protected web build archived the build it replaced and never
removed one, at 50 to 200 MB each: the local POC had collected 284 MB
in three backups. A successful build now keeps the build it replaced,
which the receipt names as the rollback target, one earlier build and
the newest failed build; the receipt lists what it removed. Removal is
best effort: a directory it cannot remove waits for the next build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The public checks after a POC rollout (health, readiness, the entry
page, the API build commit and the protected smoke checks) were each
made once. Just after a rollout the public address can still reach a
Pod that is shutting down, which answers with the old build commit, and
the link can drop: either failed a healthy release and rolled it back.
They now take up to six attempts, waiting 2 to 10 seconds; a release
whose checks never pass is still rolled back.
Retries were also silent: a build slowed down by a flaky link looked
stuck. Every repeat now says what went unanswered and when the next
attempt comes, in the run's timeline during a build and in the Runner's
log during a release. Requests and checks share one retry helper.
The third live test found kubectl cp and exec reporting a failed dial
as "error: dial tcp ...: connect: operation timed out", without the
"Unable to connect to the server" of get. That upload was not retried
and the build stopped; dial failures and connection timeouts now count
as unanswered, checked against the messages seen on the POC link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Runner only ever logged errors, as JSON lines without a time, so
its log could not be lined up with a run's timeline: during the
2026-10-26 POC tests the connection errors of every service restart
looked like current failures, and a release left no trace at all.
Each line now carries its time and level. The Runner records when it
takes a task, and how the task ended with how long it took: the task,
action and release IDs, the outcome and the seconds. These are read
defensively before the signature check, which a malformed task must
still reach; payloads, arguments and credentials are never logged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the 2026-10-26 POC run the Mac's link to the cluster API dropped
about once a minute. One unanswered kubectl call ended the whole build
twice, though the Kaniko Pod kept building, and each manual resume
re-ran the protected verification. The release path had the same
weakness with worse consequences: a dropped rollout watch counted as a
failed rollout and rolled a healthy release back.
Only requests that are safe to repeat are repeated, and only when the
cluster API left them unanswered (no connection, a broken connection,
kubectl hung), never when it refused them:
- Reads take up to six attempts, waiting 2 to 30 seconds between them.
- The builder looks its Pod up by its attempt-unique name before each
create, adopting a Pod whose create answer was lost.
- A lost source upload is sent again. Unpacking runs once at a time,
refuses an upload whose SHA-256 differs from the archive, and marks
the context ready only when complete, so Kaniko never starts from a
partial context; a damaged upload is sent again.
- A dropped rollout watch resumes for the rest of the rollout timeout.
Patches are still never repeated. A link that stays down longer still
stops the run as an infrastructure fault.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude Code and CodeBuddy report a session's usage only in their final
result. A session stopped before it (paused, canceled or out of time)
reported nothing, so its tokens never reached the run's budget or the
monthly plan: the paused session of the 2026-10-26 POC run was recorded
as 0 tokens, and repeated pauses could have spent without limit.
The adapter now adds up the usage each model response carries in the
stream, once per response although the CLI repeats it on every content
block, and reports that as the session's final usage when no total
arrives. The executor meters it like any final usage; the timeline
marks it as estimated, since the last response's output may be
undercounted.
The final result usually repeats the agent's last message word for
word, which the timeline then showed twice; it is now shown once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>