The cluster never ran Theia or the IDE gateway, so every workspace stayed
"未配置" forever. The feature is gone instead of half-present:
- API: workspace, launch and lifecycle endpoints, the gateway identity and
its internal routes, the dispatcher's workspace provisioning and the
lifecycle worker. Migration 003 deletes stored workspaces and settles
their pending outbox items.
- Provisioner: workspace provisioning and lifecycle for both backends.
- Web: the 云 IDE panel, the launch route, the start-branch picker that
listed IDE branches, and the workspace count on usage.
- apps/ide, infra/oct, dev:ide and the CI job; IDE parts of local k3s,
network policies, RBAC, docs and the architecture diagram.
A wish can still start from a pushed branch through the API (sourceBranch).
Plan files and stored entitlements may still carry maxWorkspaces; it is
accepted and ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Top-level console entry listing skills of every visible project with
project, status and category filters and search; confirm, edit, enable,
disable, delete, import SKILL.md / zip, copy to another project and
export. The project page shows a summary linking there; project settings
gain the auto-activation switch; docs describe the unified skills.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A per-tenant, per-executor settings record (GET /executor-settings,
GET/PUT /executor-settings/:provider, owner/admin, idempotent replace) with
baseUrl, defaultModel, smallFastModel, fallbackModel, timeoutMinutes, askModel
and askFallbackModel. Unset fields keep the operator's configuration.
- defaultModel is pinned at submission below the wish and bundle models.
- smallFastModel, fallbackModel and timeoutMinutes travel in the run context
to the worker; Claude Code gets ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL /
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL and --fallback-model, CodeBuddy the limit.
- baseUrl goes only with the tenant's own key, over HTTPS (plain HTTP only
where plainHttpAllowed), never in production, behind the model proxy or
with the deployment's native Claude account.
- The wish refiner tries the tenant's ask models first.
- The 执行器 page gets an 执行器设置 dialog, also in native-account mode;
model fields (and the agent page's) accept gateway names like
deepseek-flash@latest[1m].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Provide six account types and custom combinations of wish, code review,
release and management permissions, applied on each authenticated request.
- Enforce frontend-only accounts when submitting, answering, widening and
reverting wishes; require every contributor to have full access before
skipping backend code review.
- Gate code review and release decisions by their specific permissions.
- Rework member management to create and edit account types, permissions and
project access, and reflect those permissions throughout the console.
- Update the manual and architecture docs with permission tests and
end-to-end coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the agent of a frontend-only wish asks to change backend code, or keeps
changing it until the repair rounds run out, the run details offer "改为前端和
后端并继续". It answers the wish with allowBackend: the run may change backend
code from the new requirement revision on, the agent reads that the scope
changed, and the timeline records who widened it. Whether a backend change needs
a review still depends on the submitter's backend permission. Only an answer to
a frontend-only wish accepts the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Each wish says whether it may change backend code. A frontend-only wish is told
which paths it must leave alone; a change to them goes back before any check runs,
the platform puts those files back before the repair round, and the control plane
never integrates them. A wish that may change backend code integrates directly for
people with backend permission and waits for a code review otherwise.
- Owners and admins grant backend permission per person on the members page as well
as per project in the project settings.
- AI optimization has its own button for the wish and for the criteria. It writes a
wish of at most three lines (goal, scope, limits), keeps the details in checkable
criteria, and asks only what the person must decide, as choices whose answers join
the wish; suggested criteria are taken one by one.
- Lists, run titles, Feishu cards and pull request titles show a wish's first line;
the run details show the rest.
- Changed paths no longer follow renames, so moving backend code into a frontend
directory counts at both places for code review and for the frontend-only scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The architecture gains the code_review wait and gate, revert runs, Feishu
notifications, wish optimization, the new entities and how the console acts
for a local account; the POC operations guide covers accounts and the bot's
settings; the repository contract notes the review and the revert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A release counted as protected only a file named exactly Dockerfile,
the Node and Python manifests and the .github directory. The local POC
builds its images from Dockerfile.api, Dockerfile.worker and
Dockerfile.drosync-coordinator, and pins Go and Rust dependencies in
go.mod, go.sum and Cargo files: changing any of them was deployed
without approval wherever releases are preauthorized, and so were
changes to .dockerignore, *.dockerfile, Containerfiles and Gitea or
GitLab CI.
The rule now lives in the contracts package. Any Dockerfile or
Containerfile, the build context's ignore list, Compose files, every
dependency manifest and lock file the verifier knows, and the CI
locations need a person; the verifier's notion of a dependency manifest
is the same list. Ordinary source, tests and documents still go
through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A POC release counted, besides what the target branch gained, the
changes since the commit every component runs. Worker and coordinator
keep their images while only web files changed, so they lag behind the
api, and every later release counted again the changes of releases the
api had long deployed: on the POC a run's classification listed the
previous run's test file, and an earlier change to a protected web file
would have asked for approval on every api-only release after it.
A component that keeps its image does not change; the release now
counts the changes since what the api and each component built again
run. pocComponentsToBuild says which commits those are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A start that found the tenant's execution slots taken was deferred
like a failed delivery, backing off to two minutes between looks. On
the local POC, which allows one run at a time, the next person's wish
could sit for two minutes after the run before it finished or stopped
to wait, and every look left an error line in the log.
Waiting for a slot is ordinary queueing: the dispatcher now looks again
every ten seconds, one small transaction each time, and logs nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a run's change passed its checks but failed one once merged onto
a target branch that moved meanwhile, the agent got a repair round for
it, even when the failure came from commits other people had pushed:
it would change their code, and spend rounds and tokens doing so.
The verifier now runs that check, recording no evidence, on the target
branch alone. If the branch passes, combining the two caused the
failure, and the agent repairs it as before. If the branch fails too
while the commit the run started from passes, the commits pushed since
broke the branch: the run waits on the new reason target_broken, uses
no repair round, and has its own verified change as its checkpoint
again. A run that started from a commit already failing the check may
be its fix, and is repaired as before.
Continuing merges the verified change onto the repaired branch and
checks the merge. An integration that continues reuses the change's own
verification under the same policy instead of repeating the checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A release's risk only counted what the target branch gained when the
run integrated. Commits people pushed to the branch directly, and
integrations that were never deployed, went out with the next release
without being classified: an environment preauthorized for automatic
release took a migration or a Dockerfile change pushed straight to the
branch without approval. The POC chose what to rebuild from the same
narrow diff, so worker and coordinator kept running old code; on the
local POC, WishForge had in fact only ever rebuilt the api.
The control plane now gives the verifier the commit of the release the
environment runs, and the classification covers everything between it
and the release, as well as what the integration brought. On the POC,
each deployment records the commit and the image a release put there.
The build plans from that snapshot, the one the release is checked
against: worker and coordinator keep their images only while what they
run differs from the source in web files alone. A component of unknown
source (never deployed by a release, restored by a rollback, or set by
hand, which leaves the annotations stale) is rebuilt, and the release
is marked partial: it needs approval and does not roll back on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dispatcher read the run, checked that the start it was delivering
was still the pending one, and reserved the execution grant in a later
transaction. A pause and a continue in between enqueued a newer start,
and the older one went ahead anyway: it took the run's execution
generation back and asked the provisioner for a sandbox for a
generation that had already been replaced.
Reserving the grant now checks the pending start again, in the
transaction that takes the generation, and refuses a replaced one with
START_SUPERSEDED. The dispatcher acknowledges such a start without
marking the run as waiting; the newer start proceeds as usual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A build that stopped on an infrastructure fault, like the drops of the
POC's link to its cluster, repeated the whole protected verification
when continued: installation and every check, about two and a half
minutes on the POC, for a commit whose verdict could not change.
When the integrated commit is the verified checkpoint itself, the
verifier now reuses that verification evidence and only restores the
workspace for the build; the timeline says so. The control plane
offers only test and build evidence recorded under the current
protected policy, as a release requires: after the operator changes
the checks, the run verifies again. That also keeps an executor that
continues at the release stage from requesting a release with
evidence the release would refuse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent's file tools are confined to its workspace, and the
workspace holds .git. It could plant .git/config and .gitattributes
there, and the executor then ran trusted git add, diff, bundle and
merge in that workspace to export the checkpoint and start a repair
round. Git honours repo-local configuration for every command and no
environment variable disables it, so a planted clean or smudge filter,
diff or merge driver, core.fsmonitor or sshCommand, an include, or a
url.insteadOf transport rewrite would run as the worker: in the
development host mode, as the operator, outside any sandbox. The
driver names are the agent's to choose, so -c overrides cannot reach
them.
Before the checkpoint and before mergeTarget, .git/config is now
reduced to core basics, remote, branch and extensions, which is what a
clone needs to fetch, merge and bundle; everything else, the planted
drivers and includes among it, is dropped. It is redone each time,
since a paused run's agent could plant again before it resumes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the development host mode, protected checks and dependency
installations ran directly as the operator. They run the agent's code:
a test it wrote could read the home directory's secrets, reach the
network, or plant Git configuration that the trusted Git commands after
it would execute.
With WF_HOST_CHECK_SANDBOX=true they run under Seatbelt instead. File
contents in the home directory are unreadable except the command's own
directory and the paths the operator lists; it may write only there,
in the caches the operator lists and in a temporary directory of its
own, never in a .git directory. Only installations reach the network;
checks may use loopback ports by opt-in, for test suites that start
local servers. The platform's own ports (control plane, Temporal and
its web UI, database, object storage, provisioner, Git service, IDE,
console) stay blocked in any case: the local start lists them from
their configured addresses. Checks get no answer from the keychain,
and a command whose home is the executor's (holding its credentials)
gets a private one. A sandbox that cannot start leaves the run waiting
on infrastructure; verification evidence records checkSandbox.
scripts/check-host-check-sandbox.ts checks all of this on the target
Mac, from outside the sandbox, then runs the POC's installation and
checks sandboxed on a recent droboticflow source. Enabled on the local
POC, a real wish passed through both, including a repair round for the
agent's own failing tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude Code and CodeBuddy report a session's usage only in their final
result. A session stopped before it (paused, canceled or out of time)
reported nothing, so its tokens never reached the run's budget or the
monthly plan: the paused session of the 2026-10-26 POC run was recorded
as 0 tokens, and repeated pauses could have spent without limit.
The adapter now adds up the usage each model response carries in the
stream, once per response although the CLI repeats it on every content
block, and reports that as the session's final usage when no total
arrives. The executor meters it like any final usage; the timeline
marks it as estimated, since the last response's output may be
undercounted.
The final result usually repeats the agent's last message word for
word, which the timeline then showed twice; it is now shown once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pausing revoked the executor at once: the agent was killed and the work
of the current attempt stayed only in the executor's local workspace,
so continuing started that attempt over.
A pause of a run whose executor holds the lease now drains it first:
- The run keeps `running` with pauseRequestedAt (the console shows
pausing). Its agent gets no model credential and no new model
request; continuing is refused until the pause completes; cancelling
still stops it at once.
- The executor learns of it from its heartbeat, stops the agent, saves
a checkpoint with its live lease and completes the pause through
/internal/runs/:id/pause. Continuing restores that checkpoint.
- The workflow is stopped only after the pause completes; stopping it
earlier would abort the save. A model request interrupted by the
stop no longer expires the pausing run's lease.
- If the executor does not complete it within two minutes, or stopped,
the heartbeat, the next lease, the coordinator's wait or the
background sweep pause the run anyway.
Runs no executor is working on still pause at once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The runner took the newest ready release and threw when it was
stale, on every poll, so nothing else in the environment deployed.
Polling now fails stale ready releases (canceled runs, revised
requirements, changed code, configuration or approval), tells their
runs, and deploys the next one. A paused run's release waits, since
continuing may make it current again.
- A rollback the runner reported as failed stayed unknown and held the
environment, which neither unlock nor another rollback could free. A
definite failure now frees it; an unknown rollback can be unlocked by
an owner or admin after checking the target, which cancels it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every failed installation waited as an infrastructure fault. When the
agent's own change broke it (a misspelled package, say), continuing
installed the same manifests before the agent ran, failed again, and
the agent never got a turn: the run could not move without a new
requirement revision.
- The verifier attributes a failed installation to the checkpoint when
it changed dependency manifests (package.json, go.mod, lockfiles and
the like) and the output is not a network or registry failure. The
evidence lists those manifests, and the control plane records an
`install` failure that the next repair round fixes.
- A repair round for an `install` failure starts the agent even when
the installation fails again, with that output in the prompt.
- Prompts, lessons and the run page name the failed installation.
Any other failed installation still waits for the environment, without
spending a repair round.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_SANDBOX=true, Claude Code also gets Bash, run in
its built-in sandbox through --settings:
- The sandbox must start (failIfUnavailable), and no command may run
outside it (allowUnsandboxedCommands: false).
- No network: an empty allowedDomains with strictAllowlist, since an
absent allowlist leaves the network open. Local binding stays off,
because it would also open every local port, Temporal's included.
- Commands cannot read the home directories, the CLI's home or the
worker's own directory, except the workspace, a per-run scratch
directory and WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_READ_PATHS; they write only to the
workspace and the scratch directory; credential variables are unset.
- WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_ENV gives commands toolchain variables, such as the
POC's read-only Go module cache.
The executor probes the sandbox first (Seatbelt on macOS; bubblewrap
and socat on Linux) and keeps file tools only where it cannot start,
saying so on the timeline. The adapter now writes the execution
contract into the prompt, for the tools the agent actually has.
scripts/check-claude-command-sandbox.ts checks a machine with one short
real session and judges each probe by its effect, not the agent's
account. On the local Mac every probe was blocked; the login keychain
remains reachable, because Claude Code's Seatbelt profile always allows
the security server. That limit is documented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude Code with a tenant key started with bypassPermissions and every
tool, Bash included, and loaded the repository's settings, hooks and MCP
servers. It now runs like the native development login already did:
restricted mode with dontAsk, only Read/Edit/Write/Glob/Grep, confined to
the workspace, and no repository or user settings. Every Claude Code run
is told the verifier runs installs and tests.
CodeBuddy's agent runs commands with no sandbox of its own. Like Codex
without its sandbox, it now starts only in a development (host) sandbox,
says so on the timeline, and stops with PROVIDER_SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE on
Kata.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first runs on k3s found these problems; a wish now goes from submission
through the Codex executor, independent verification and integration in
per-run pods.
- Development deployments refused to start because the images set
NODE_ENV=production. The local manifest and the sandbox Jobs now set
NODE_ENV to the deployment mode.
- The model proxy treated x-client-request-id as a per-request idempotency
key. Codex sends its conversation id there, so every second request of a
session failed with 409. Only Idempotency-Key names a single request now.
- Codex's command sandbox (bubblewrap) cannot start in a runc pod. Every
command failed and the agent retried until the budget ran out. The
executor now probes the sandbox before starting Codex. A Kata sandbox that
cannot run it waits as PROVIDER_SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. A development (host)
sandbox runs Codex without it, and the timeline records that.
- The prompt asked agents to commit, but Codex keeps .git read-only and the
platform commits the checkpoint itself. Agents now leave their changes
uncommitted, and get the platform's Git identity if they commit anyway. A
resolved merge is recorded even when its tree equals HEAD.
- scripts/k3s-local.mjs:
- excludes the VM and cluster ranges from a host proxy (NO_PROXY);
- uses its own Docker client configuration, so a stale credential
helper does not break builds;
- recovers from an interrupted k3s install;
- reports when Colima switches the current kubectl or Docker context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adding an executor touched the contracts, the API's availability check, the
worker and the console separately. Now it is an adapter plus one entry in
@wishforge/contracts' providerCatalog (name, executable variable, whether the
model proxy isolates its credentials) and one in the worker's
providerRegistry; the API, the console's options and MCP's submit_wish read
the catalog, and a test checks every entry is registered with the worker.
The CodeBuddy adapter already parsed Claude-Code-style stream-json, so it is
now a StreamJsonCliAdapter with a dialect per CLI. Claude Code runs headless
with --verbose and --permission-mode bypassPermissions inside the per-run
sandbox and receives only ANTHROPIC_* credentials (WF_CLAUDE_BIN). Like
CodeBuddy it is development-only until the model proxy supports it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In Kubernetes mode the per-run network policy allowed only DNS, the API,
Temporal and Git, so dependency installs could not reach a registry and image
builds had no builder.
- WF_RUN_INSTALL_PROXY_URL points both sandboxes at an operator's egress proxy
(pods labelled egress-proxy); the per-run policy admits it and installation
commands get HTTP(S)_PROXY, also inside bubblewrap, while checks still have
no network.
- WF_VERIFIER_DOCKER_HOST with a TLS client certificate points the verifier at
a remote builder daemon (pods labelled image-builder); a separate policy
lets only the verifier pod reach it, and release deletes that policy too.
Builds pass DOCKER_HOST, DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY and DOCKER_CERT_PATH, and refuse
a Docker context and a remote builder together.
- The control namespace's baseline admits sandbox traffic to both components.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sandboxes can reach Temporal, which used to accept any client in one shared
namespace. Now:
- Every Temporal client (API dispatcher, coordinator, deployer, sandboxes) can
present a client certificate (TEMPORAL_TLS_*); production refuses to start
without one.
- TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE_PREFIX gives each tenant its own namespace: the dispatcher
starts and signals a tenant's workflows there, the shared coordinator and
deployer poll every served tenant's namespace with one workflow bundle, and a
sandbox polls only its tenant's. Production refuses to serve several tenants
through one namespace.
- The Kubernetes provisioner mounts the tenant's Temporal client certificate
into executor and verifier pods (WF_RUN_TEMPORAL_TLS_SECRET, required in
production); the local provisioner passes the TLS settings through.
Authorizing certificates per namespace remains Temporal server configuration;
the operations guide describes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A first implementation round may end, without changing any files, with a
QUESTIONS: section of up to five questions. The executor then puts the run in
the clarification wait with the questions in its detail, where the console and
MCP show them; answering already creates a new requirement revision that
starts again from planning. Repair rounds cannot ask: they must fix what the
verifier found.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
People's changes now reach the target branch the same way the agent's do. The
IDE credential carries a ref prefix and the Git service runs a pre-receive hook
on every push that refuses updates outside it, so the IDE can push only
`ide/` branches; the platform's own integration is unaffected.
- A wish may name a source branch. The run starts from that branch's head, the
agent builds on it, and verification, repair rounds, merging onto a moved
target and conflict repair work as before. A missing branch makes the run
wait (git_storage) until it is pushed.
- Release risk is now computed from the target branch before integration, not
from where the run started: a migration committed on the source branch would
otherwise have been missed and could have skipped approval.
- Clones work on `ide/work`; a plain `git push` publishes it.
- The console lists a project's IDE branches with a button to submit a wish
that merges one, and the new-wish form has a starting-point field; MCP
`submit_wish` accepts `sourceBranch`. The Git service lists branches under
a prefix for this (`POST /refs`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While someone has a workspace open, the gateway asks the API for a 15-minute
write token for the project's platform repository on behalf of that person
(membership and role checked each time) and delivers it to the workspace
backend. The backend writes it to a Git config file outside the repository
(a memory volume in Kubernetes) that the clone includes, and on the first
delivery clones the target branch into a folder named after the project. The
workspace cannot mint credentials itself, so access ends with the last
session.
- People commit and push to the target branch like with any Git server; the
platform only accepts fast-forwards, and the next wish starts from that
commit (covered end to end in the local loop test).
- Commits are authored by whoever opened the latest session, from the name and
email in their sign-in; their own git config overrides it.
- Only the gateway can reach the delivery endpoint: it needs Theia's
connection token, and the gateway refuses the path for browsers.
- The provisioner pins the workspace to its repository and lets the pod reach
the Git service; the Kubernetes baseline admits that traffic. External
repositories are not cloned.
- The local shared Theia clones each project into its own folder.
- The Theia image installs Git, and its stage is named theia: the default
build target of that Dockerfile is the gateway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operations, development and architecture docs, the reference pages and the
component READMEs were rewritten against the code: every documented variable
exists, and the settings operators need (runtime image, Git service, listen
addresses, Runner targets, single-tenant gateway and provisioner bindings) are
documented.
Gaps the docs used to present as working are now stated as such: IDE
workspaces do not clone the project yet (FR-H2), and in Kubernetes mode
dependency installs and image builds have no network path until an egress
proxy and builder access exist. The Kubernetes README describes what the
provisioner creates, what the Runner needs in a target namespace, and the
cluster acceptance that is still outstanding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verification ran git inside the tree under test, kept no command output and
treated every infrastructure fault as a test failure; repairs went through an
executor lease the coordinator should not hold; and a project without delivery
could never succeed. This reworks the worker execution path and the control-plane
contracts it depends on.
- Verification exports the exact commit to a directory without .git, installs
dependencies (network allowed) and runs the protected commands under
bubblewrap in kata mode or directly in host mode; evidence records exit code,
duration, digest, a redacted output tail and the isolation used. Production
rejects host evidence. A failed installation waits as infrastructure.
- Waiting reasons are an enum with a redacted detail; dispatcher, GitHub and
model-proxy states map onto it, and the console explains each one with a way out.
- Repairs are requested by the coordinator through /internal/runs/:id/repair;
the control plane derives the failure summary from the verifier's evidence and
enforces the repair budget. Continuing after the budget is spent grants one more
round; a new requirement revision starts a fresh budget.
- Execution identities may only move a run within their own stages and only to
running or waiting; success comes from integration evidence (no delivery
configured) or deployment acceptance. The unused preview stage is gone.
- Integration fast-forwards when the target has not moved, merges and re-verifies
otherwise, retries when a push finds the target moved, and turns merge conflicts
into a repair round that merges the current target for the agent to resolve.
- Successful runs that needed a repair leave a project lesson; active lessons are
injected into later prompts, and admins can list, add, disable and delete them.
- Executor progress (messages, commands, file changes, plan updates) is stored as
normalized events; previously agent messages were recorded as the literal word
"output". Provider failures keep the work as a checkpoint and wait as
provider_error instead of failing the run.
- Workers declare WF_SANDBOX_MODE=host|kata (host refused in production),
heartbeat with retries until the lease could have expired, and retry safe
control-plane reads with backoff.
- tests/local-loop.test.ts runs the loop end to end with real Git, the in-process
control plane behind its internal routes and a scripted agent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The invoice/settlement flow produced statements whose every monetary
field was null, behind a review/settle/void ceremony. Model charges are
billed by the provider directly, so the platform only needs to report
measured usage.
- apps/api/src/domain/usage.ts replaces billing.ts: per-month usage
lines, totals, model-measurement coverage and a formula-safe CSV
export. No invoice digest, settlement records or billing entities.
- Routes: GET /v1/usage/lines and /v1/usage/export (owner/admin),
GET /v1/plans; platform-operator actions move to
POST /v1/admin/members and /v1/admin/executions/:id/reconcile.
The operator allow-list is now WF_OPERATOR_SUBJECTS.
- Contracts: UsageLine replaces BillingUsageLine/BillingInvoice; the
billing_event and billing_period entity kinds are removed.
- Web usage page shows limits, occupancy, monthly totals and lines.
- npm script tenant:invite is renamed tenant:create (it provisions a
tenant).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- docs/architecture.md replaces system-design.md: component map,
run state machine with an explicit waiting-reason catalogue, key
sequences (dispatch, execute/verify/repair, integrate, release,
IDE launch, lessons), data model, API surface, identity and trust
model, isolation modes (host for local development, kata for
production), deployment topology, ADRs, known limitations and a
requirement-to-test verification matrix.
- docs/development.md: local setup, one-command start, first wish,
IDE, MCP and the test matrix (integration toggles are explicit).
- docs/operations.md: production prerequisites, explicit deployment
mode, component configuration, Kubernetes provisioner, tenants and
quotas, IDE gateway routing and lifecycle, delivery, monitoring,
backup/restore, incident handling and known risks. Merges the former
observability, recovery, billing-entitlements and runbook documents.
- Contract documents move to docs/reference/; evidence narratives that
pointed at machine-local /private/tmp files are removed and the UI
reference is rewritten for the target console.
- Delete docs for removed scope: workspace snapshot handoff and private
application access.
- README rewritten as a concise entry point.
The documents describe the target state that the following
implementation commits realise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>