56 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
eust-w
4cffd71be8 ✨ Learn project skills from runs, and export a wish's report
- Skills: per-project know-how the platform proposes from each succeeded
  run (in the background, or on request from a run), people confirm,
  edit, disable, delete or write; active ones enter later prompts
- Export one skill as SKILL.md, or all as a zip with a directory per
  skill, as .claude/skills/ expects
- A wish's report: every run, its stage timeline, the agent's plan,
  replies, commands, changed files and model usage, the change, the
  checks, failures, reviews and releases, and the full event log, as
  Markdown, or laid out for printing to PDF

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 03:57:24 +08:00
eust-w
6d615c0ffd ⚖️ Count cache reads a tenth toward budgets, and allow runs up to 10M tokens
- countedTokens: input, output and cache creation in full, cache reads a
  tenth, as they cost; the worker meters Claude CLI usage with it and the
  usage event says how much counted
- A run's token budget may be raised to 10,000,000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 03:26:27 +08:00
eust-w
72085cf752 ✨ Let a project offer models and a wish choose one
- Projects list the models their wishes may run with, the first by
  default; owners and admins set them in the project settings
- A wish may choose one of its project's models; the choice is checked
  and pinned to the run, which shows it, and the executor starts the
  agent with it (--model), else with the agent configuration's
- Model names may be spelled as the model gateway does
  (deepseek-pro@latest[1m]), in projects and agent configurations alike

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 03:08:35 +08:00
eust-w
aa151d16f9 ✨ Deliver to Fanyu's cluster from the dev branch beside the POC
- Profiles pin each environment: POC (branch poc) and Fanyu (branch dev,
  180.76.138.88, droboticflow-fanyu), with their Deployments by UID
- Releases expect every Deployment of their profile; Fanyu's api image
  also runs its annotation processor and validator, each rolled back to
  its own image
- Bindings may list several projects; each Runner has its own settings
- fanyu-access: least-privilege identity and build-Pod admission policy in
  Fanyu's cluster, its token only in the executor and Fanyu's Runner
- projects --replace: delete every project with all it holds, then create
  the POC and Fanyu projects, their environments and Runners
- Ship the Runner's public keys in the ConfigMap, not a Mac path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 17:47:47 +08:00
eust-w
addf330b10 ✨ Add account types and enforce per-user wish permissions
- Provide six account types and custom combinations of wish, code review,
  release and management permissions, applied on each authenticated request.
- Enforce frontend-only accounts when submitting, answering, widening and
  reverting wishes; require every contributor to have full access before
  skipping backend code review.
- Gate code review and release decisions by their specific permissions.
- Rework member management to create and edit account types, permissions and
  project access, and reflect those permissions throughout the console.
- Update the manual and architecture docs with permission tests and
  end-to-end coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 12:07:08 +08:00
eust-w
17553e2f8f ✨ Let a person widen a frontend-only wish to backend code
When the agent of a frontend-only wish asks to change backend code, or keeps
changing it until the repair rounds run out, the run details offer "改为前端和
后端并继续". It answers the wish with allowBackend: the run may change backend
code from the new requirement revision on, the agent reads that the scope
changed, and the timeline records who widened it. Whether a backend change needs
a review still depends on the submitter's backend permission. Only an answer to
a frontend-only wish accepts the flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 23:19:08 +08:00
eust-w
bf3313620e ✨ Let each wish stay frontend-only, and optimize wishes into short goals with choices
- Each wish says whether it may change backend code. A frontend-only wish is told
  which paths it must leave alone; a change to them goes back before any check runs,
  the platform puts those files back before the repair round, and the control plane
  never integrates them. A wish that may change backend code integrates directly for
  people with backend permission and waits for a code review otherwise.
- Owners and admins grant backend permission per person on the members page as well
  as per project in the project settings.
- AI optimization has its own button for the wish and for the criteria. It writes a
  wish of at most three lines (goal, scope, limits), keeps the details in checkable
  criteria, and asks only what the person must decide, as choices whose answers join
  the wish; suggested criteria are taken one by one.
- Lists, run titles, Feishu cards and pull request titles show a wish's first line;
  the run details show the rest.
- Changed paths no longer follow renames, so moving backend code into a frontend
  directory counts at both places for code review and for the frontend-only scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 20:37:30 +08:00
eust-w
44b1bee723 🐛 Treat POC images deployed by tag as of unknown source
Someone deployed the POC api and worker outside WishForge by mutable tags,
and every build then stopped with a raw validation error: the cluster
snapshot only accepted digest-pinned images.

A component running a tag is now of unknown source, as one set by hand
already was: the timeline names the component and its tag, the build makes
it again, and the release needs a person's approval. A release still deploys
digests only; what it replaces may be a tag of the same repository, and such
a release never declares itself rollback-compatible, since what the tag
pointed at may be gone. An image neither pinned nor tagged, or not of the
component's repository, stops the build with a message naming it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 17:58:42 +08:00
eust-w
a4eaefc69f ✨ Hold reviewed paths, take back runs, optimize wishes and notify in Feishu
What the pilot asked for, from its meeting:

- Code review: a project names the paths changes to which a person reviews
  before they reach the target branch (globs, with exceptions). After the
  checks pass, the verifier asks the control plane, and the run waits at
  integration until an owner or admin approves the exact commit; approving
  integrates it without repeating the checks, rejecting hands the comment to
  the agent as a new requirement. Continuing cannot get around it: the
  verifier asks again before every integration.
- Undo: "take back this change" starts a run that reverses what a run
  integrated on the current target branch, three-way, keeping later commits;
  only lines later commits changed too go to the agent. It then verifies,
  integrates and delivers like any run. Releases get a rollback button for the
  version live in their environment.
- Wish optimization: the local Claude account rewrites a draft wish and its
  acceptance criteria by built-in and project rules, with no tools at all;
  the person compares and decides, nothing is submitted for them.
- Release confirmation: an environment can make every release wait for a
  person, not only those the risk rules flag.
- Feishu notifications: a group bot is told of releases awaiting approval and
  changes awaiting review (mentioning the decision makers), runs that need a
  person, finished runs and failed releases; each once, signed when a secret
  is set, with text from runs never acting as card markup.
- Reviewers see the agent's change summary and who submitted the wish, and
  whether the checks ran in the macOS sandbox; the wish form offers only the
  executors this deployment can run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 17:08:27 +08:00
eust-w
e8f99f4b24 👥 Let each person sign in with an account of their own
Everyone used the one local administrator, so the system could not tell who
asked for a change, and anyone could approve anything. Owners and admins now
create accounts on a members page: a login name, a display name and a role,
with a password shown once. The control plane keeps only its scrypt hash, and
account creation is deliberately not replayable by idempotency key, so the
password is stored nowhere a replay could return it.

The console checks a password through a control plane route its proxy never
forwards from a browser, then calls the control plane with its local
credential plus the person's account and password version; those headers
count only together with that credential. Disabling an account stops it at
once, and resetting a password ends its existing sessions. A session that is
neither the administrator nor a valid account gets no credential at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 17:08:14 +08:00
eust-w
862a133f36 🌐 Name the reasons a release waits for approval in Chinese
The release page listed why a release needs approval as the control
plane wrote it, in English, while everything around it is Chinese, and
approving is the one decision there that a person has to make.

The reasons now live in the contracts package, in a module that imports
nothing, as the provider list does: the control plane gives them and the
console names each in Chinese, a protected change with its path. A
reason the console has no name for fails its type check; one it does
not know at all is shown as it came.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 11:32:08 +08:00
eust-w
9099f06ba8 🔒 Ask for approval on every image recipe and dependency manifest
A release counted as protected only a file named exactly Dockerfile,
the Node and Python manifests and the .github directory. The local POC
builds its images from Dockerfile.api, Dockerfile.worker and
Dockerfile.drosync-coordinator, and pins Go and Rust dependencies in
go.mod, go.sum and Cargo files: changing any of them was deployed
without approval wherever releases are preauthorized, and so were
changes to .dockerignore, *.dockerfile, Containerfiles and Gitea or
GitLab CI.

The rule now lives in the contracts package. Any Dockerfile or
Containerfile, the build context's ignore list, Compose files, every
dependency manifest and lock file the verifier knows, and the CI
locations need a person; the verifier's notion of a dependency manifest
is the same list. Ordinary source, tests and documents still go
through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 22:43:13 +08:00
eust-w
2b9dab593b ⚡ Start a queued run within seconds of an execution slot freeing
A start that found the tenant's execution slots taken was deferred
like a failed delivery, backing off to two minutes between looks. On
the local POC, which allows one run at a time, the next person's wish
could sit for two minutes after the run before it finished or stopped
to wait, and every look left an error line in the log.

Waiting for a slot is ordinary queueing: the dispatcher now looks again
every ten seconds, one small transaction each time, and logs nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 19:56:55 +08:00
eust-w
6722319314 🔒 Weigh a release by everything its environment does not run yet
A release's risk only counted what the target branch gained when the
run integrated. Commits people pushed to the branch directly, and
integrations that were never deployed, went out with the next release
without being classified: an environment preauthorized for automatic
release took a migration or a Dockerfile change pushed straight to the
branch without approval. The POC chose what to rebuild from the same
narrow diff, so worker and coordinator kept running old code; on the
local POC, WishForge had in fact only ever rebuilt the api.

The control plane now gives the verifier the commit of the release the
environment runs, and the classification covers everything between it
and the release, as well as what the integration brought. On the POC,
each deployment records the commit and the image a release put there.
The build plans from that snapshot, the one the release is checked
against: worker and coordinator keep their images only while what they
run differs from the source in web files alone. A component of unknown
source (never deployed by a release, restored by a rollback, or set by
hand, which leaves the annotations stale) is rebuilt, and the release
is marked partial: it needs approval and does not roll back on its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 16:44:13 +08:00
eust-w
df87c5dca6 🐛 Drop a run start that a newer one replaced before it takes the run back
The dispatcher read the run, checked that the start it was delivering
was still the pending one, and reserved the execution grant in a later
transaction. A pause and a continue in between enqueued a newer start,
and the older one went ahead anyway: it took the run's execution
generation back and asked the provisioner for a sandbox for a
generation that had already been replaced.

Reserving the grant now checks the pending start again, in the
transaction that takes the generation, and refuses a replaced one with
START_SUPERSEDED. The dispatcher acknowledges such a start without
marking the run as waiting; the newer start proceeds as usual.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 15:56:14 +08:00
eust-w
ad06e82c67 ⚡ Reuse the verification of an integrated commit when its build continues
A build that stopped on an infrastructure fault, like the drops of the
POC's link to its cluster, repeated the whole protected verification
when continued: installation and every check, about two and a half
minutes on the POC, for a commit whose verdict could not change.

When the integrated commit is the verified checkpoint itself, the
verifier now reuses that verification evidence and only restores the
workspace for the build; the timeline says so. The control plane
offers only test and build evidence recorded under the current
protected policy, as a release requires: after the operator changes
the checks, the run verifies again. That also keeps an executor that
continues at the release stage from requesting a release with
evidence the release would refuse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 14:54:01 +08:00
eust-w
01acc236a0 🔒 Keep internal failures out of MCP tool results, as the HTTP API does
The HTTP API answers an unexpected failure with a generic message and
leaves the details to the server log. The MCP tools returned any
error's message to the client instead: a database, filesystem or
upstream failure could hand an agent client connection strings, table
names or internal paths.

MCP tool results now follow the HTTP API's rules: domain errors keep
their code, message and details, invalid input reports its validation
issues, and anything else is INTERNAL_ERROR with a pointer to the
server log, where the details are written.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 14:54:01 +08:00
eust-w
fbcd273a08 🐛 Count the tokens of a stopped Claude Code session, and show its last message once
Claude Code and CodeBuddy report a session's usage only in their final
result. A session stopped before it (paused, canceled or out of time)
reported nothing, so its tokens never reached the run's budget or the
monthly plan: the paused session of the 2026-10-26 POC run was recorded
as 0 tokens, and repeated pauses could have spent without limit.

The adapter now adds up the usage each model response carries in the
stream, once per response although the CLI repeats it on every content
block, and reports that as the session's final usage when no total
arrives. The executor meters it like any final usage; the timeline
marks it as estimated, since the last response's output may be
undercounted.

The final result usually repeats the agent's last message word for
word, which the timeline then showed twice; it is now shown once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 02:24:42 +08:00
eust-w
e734bd9846 🐛 Decide which limit stops a stalled model call when its timer is set
The stall timer chose between "idle" and "deadline" by reading the clock
when it fired. A timer armed for the idle limit could fire after the
deadline had also passed on a busy machine, and was then reported as a
deadline stop, which the proxy test caught intermittently. The reason
is now fixed when the timer is armed: whichever limit is nearer.

The two timing tests also get wider margins: the steady stream sends a
frame every 30 ms against a 300 ms idle limit, and the deadline case
can only be stopped by its deadline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 01:53:19 +08:00
eust-w
fe13f6c862 🔒 Hide a workspace's internal upstream when it is requested again
Requesting a project's workspace returned the existing record as
stored, including the internal Theia and collaboration upstreams that
the list leaves out. Both now show the same public fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 19:11:12 +08:00
eust-w
9c879ff3c5 🐛 Let a failed build resume, and keep the release risk it classified
- verifyRun returned deliver() unawaited inside try/finally, so the
  session closed and deleted the workspace while the build still used
  it: a build continued after an infrastructure failure always failed.
  The failure handlers there were unawaited too.
- The resumed build classified the release risk from the checkpoint's
  base, not the target branch it integrated onto, and replaced the
  earlier classification: a migration brought by an IDE branch no
  longer counted. Integration evidence now records the target commit
  it integrated onto, the resumed build classifies from it, and a
  commit's classification only ever widens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 19:11:12 +08:00
eust-w
5df77ad761 🔒 Authenticate internal callers without the write lock; retire superseded generations
- Looking up a run-scoped token or a runner token ran in a write
  transaction, which holds the tenant's advisory lock: anyone with a
  long enough token could tie up every change of the tenant, and each
  executor heartbeat, event and meter took that lock just to
  authenticate. The lookups now only read.
- Continuing or answering a run queues a new generation, but until the
  dispatcher started it, the old generation's token still worked and
  could even lease the run again for the new requirement revision. A
  generation now stops acting as soon as a newer one is pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 19:11:12 +08:00
eust-w
30369c1430 ✨ Save the agent's work before a run pauses
Pausing revoked the executor at once: the agent was killed and the work
of the current attempt stayed only in the executor's local workspace,
so continuing started that attempt over.

A pause of a run whose executor holds the lease now drains it first:

- The run keeps `running` with pauseRequestedAt (the console shows
  pausing). Its agent gets no model credential and no new model
  request; continuing is refused until the pause completes; cancelling
  still stops it at once.
- The executor learns of it from its heartbeat, stops the agent, saves
  a checkpoint with its live lease and completes the pause through
  /internal/runs/:id/pause. Continuing restores that checkpoint.
- The workflow is stopped only after the pause completes; stopping it
  earlier would abort the save. A model request interrupted by the
  stop no longer expires the pausing run's lease.
- If the executor does not complete it within two minutes, or stopped,
  the heartbeat, the next lease, the coordinator's wait or the
  background sweep pause the run anyway.

Runs no executor is working on still pause at once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 18:38:06 +08:00
eust-w
1f7360075b 🐛 Keep deployments moving past stale releases and failed rollbacks
- The runner took the newest ready release and threw when it was
  stale, on every poll, so nothing else in the environment deployed.
  Polling now fails stale ready releases (canceled runs, revised
  requirements, changed code, configuration or approval), tells their
  runs, and deploys the next one. A paused run's release waits, since
  continuing may make it current again.
- A rollback the runner reported as failed stayed unknown and held the
  environment, which neither unlock nor another rollback could free. A
  definite failure now frees it; an unknown rollback can be unlocked by
  an owner or admin after checking the target, which cancels it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 17:32:16 +08:00
eust-w
9b2c8f14a9 🐛 Repair installations the agent's manifest changes broke instead of waiting
Every failed installation waited as an infrastructure fault. When the
agent's own change broke it (a misspelled package, say), continuing
installed the same manifests before the agent ran, failed again, and
the agent never got a turn: the run could not move without a new
requirement revision.

- The verifier attributes a failed installation to the checkpoint when
  it changed dependency manifests (package.json, go.mod, lockfiles and
  the like) and the output is not a network or registry failure. The
  evidence lists those manifests, and the control plane records an
  `install` failure that the next repair round fixes.
- A repair round for an `install` failure starts the agent even when
  the installation fails again, with that output in the prompt.
- Prompts, lessons and the run page name the failed installation.

Any other failed installation still waits for the environment, without
spending a repair round.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 17:32:16 +08:00
eust-w
a89cd1b9b3 ✨ Let Claude Code run commands inside its own sandbox, by operator opt-in
With WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_SANDBOX=true, Claude Code also gets Bash, run in
its built-in sandbox through --settings:

- The sandbox must start (failIfUnavailable), and no command may run
  outside it (allowUnsandboxedCommands: false).
- No network: an empty allowedDomains with strictAllowlist, since an
  absent allowlist leaves the network open. Local binding stays off,
  because it would also open every local port, Temporal's included.
- Commands cannot read the home directories, the CLI's home or the
  worker's own directory, except the workspace, a per-run scratch
  directory and WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_READ_PATHS; they write only to the
  workspace and the scratch directory; credential variables are unset.
- WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_ENV gives commands toolchain variables, such as the
  POC's read-only Go module cache.

The executor probes the sandbox first (Seatbelt on macOS; bubblewrap
and socat on Linux) and keeps file tools only where it cannot start,
saying so on the timeline. The adapter now writes the execution
contract into the prompt, for the tools the agent actually has.

scripts/check-claude-command-sandbox.ts checks a machine with one short
real session and judges each probe by its effect, not the agent's
account. On the local Mac every probe was blocked; the login keychain
remains reachable, because Claude Code's Seatbelt profile always allows
the security server. That limit is documented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 14:48:16 +08:00
eust-w
fc90c932ba 🔒 Confine Claude Code to workspace file tools and keep CodeBuddy off Kata
Claude Code with a tenant key started with bypassPermissions and every
tool, Bash included, and loaded the repository's settings, hooks and MCP
servers. It now runs like the native development login already did:
restricted mode with dontAsk, only Read/Edit/Write/Glob/Grep, confined to
the workspace, and no repository or user settings. Every Claude Code run
is told the verifier runs installs and tests.

CodeBuddy's agent runs commands with no sandbox of its own. Like Codex
without its sandbox, it now starts only in a development (host) sandbox,
says so on the timeline, and stops with PROVIDER_SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE on
Kata.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 05:25:36 +08:00
eust-w
42d28f7013 🔒 Let only a person add or revoke provider credentials
Connector tokens (MCP and other agent clients) held by an owner or admin
could replace or revoke the tenant's provider key through
/v1/provider-connections. Creating and revoking now require a human, as
creating environments and registering runners already do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 04:04:27 +08:00
eust-w
e1c381486d 🐛 Keep long model streams alive and retry rejected model requests
The proxy aborted every upstream call 120 seconds after it started, even
while the model was still streaming, so a long reasoning turn ended as an
unknown outcome that an admin had to reconcile. Calls now stop only when
no bytes arrive for 2 minutes, or after 10 minutes in total, inside the
15 minutes after which the reaper treats a request as lost. The recorded
reason says which limit stopped it.

A rejected request (a 429, an invalid request, or one stopped before
upstream I/O) was stored and replayed for every retry of the same body,
so one rate limit stalled the run for the rest of its lease. Rejections
use no tokens, so a retry is now sent again; completed responses are
still replayed and unknown outcomes still wait for reconciliation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 04:04:27 +08:00
eust-w
6fc7eaf00c ✨ Improve local WishForge reliability and LAN access
Detect actual service and Runner readiness, restore LAN access after network changes, protect production web builds with rollback, honor cancellation during executor startup, and show truthful cached-data and credential states.
2026-10-25 03:29:51 +08:00
eust-w
4e5ab1719c ✨ Enable local Claude delivery to Gitea and POC
Add authenticated LAN access, native Claude execution, checkpoint and budget recovery, and signed POC build/deploy/rollback contracts. Include local service management, regression coverage, and evidence from the completed POC delivery.
2026-10-22 16:21:33 +08:00
eust-w
b4ece6057c fix: let the console build, and stop runs that cannot afford the next model request
Building the web image showed that `next build` failed.
- The console imported runtime values from the contracts entry point.
- Turbopack cannot follow the NodeNext `.js` imports inside that entry,
  which also carries zod and every schema into the browser.
- Only `next dev` had ever run before, and the console used to import
  types only.

The fix:
- The executor catalog moves to an entry without imports, exported as
  @wishforge/contracts/providers. The console takes its values from
  there.
- providerBaseUrl moves to its own module.
- A test keeps value imports of the entry point out of the console.

With the console's default budget of 50,000 tokens, every Codex run
stopped after one model request:
- The proxy reserves one token per request byte, and a Codex request is
  already about 50 KB.
- The executor then reported a bare 429 as a provider failure.

The fix:
- A request the remaining budget cannot cover now puts the run into the
  `budget` wait, with what it needs and what remains.
- The console defaults to 300,000 tokens and explains the reservation.

The run page also marked the stage a successful run ended in as not yet
done; it now shows it as complete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 05:20:27 +08:00
eust-w
27b6e19d6b fix: run a wish end to end on the local k3s cluster
The first runs on k3s found these problems; a wish now goes from submission
through the Codex executor, independent verification and integration in
per-run pods.

- Development deployments refused to start because the images set
  NODE_ENV=production. The local manifest and the sandbox Jobs now set
  NODE_ENV to the deployment mode.
- The model proxy treated x-client-request-id as a per-request idempotency
  key. Codex sends its conversation id there, so every second request of a
  session failed with 409. Only Idempotency-Key names a single request now.
- Codex's command sandbox (bubblewrap) cannot start in a runc pod. Every
  command failed and the agent retried until the budget ran out. The
  executor now probes the sandbox before starting Codex. A Kata sandbox that
  cannot run it waits as PROVIDER_SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. A development (host)
  sandbox runs Codex without it, and the timeline records that.
- The prompt asked agents to commit, but Codex keeps .git read-only and the
  platform commits the checkpoint itself. Agents now leave their changes
  uncommitted, and get the platform's Git identity if they commit anyway. A
  resolved merge is recorded even when its tree equals HEAD.
- scripts/k3s-local.mjs:
  - excludes the VM and cluster ranges from a host proxy (NO_PROXY);
  - uses its own Docker client configuration, so a stale credential
    helper does not break builds;
  - recovers from an interrupted k3s install;
  - reports when Colima switches the current kubectl or Docker context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 01:47:33 +08:00
eust-w
8b77085a5f fix: let Kubernetes sandboxes start, and run on a local development cluster
Sandbox Jobs never received WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE, which every worker requires
before anything else, so each Kubernetes sandbox exited at start. The
provisioner now passes its own mode.

A local development cluster (k3s) has no Kata, no bubblewrap inside runc and no
TLS between services. For it, and only with WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=development:

- WF_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true lets services reach each other over plain HTTP
  (Git, the model proxy, the provisioner and IDE gateway targets, the worker's
  control-plane client); production refuses the setting outright.
- The provisioner accepts WF_RUN_SANDBOX_MODE=host and WF_KATA_RUNTIME_CLASS=none
  and passes the HTTP settings to its sandboxes.
- The development seed is built into the image (dist/api/seed.mjs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 00:56:07 +08:00
eust-w
3eb8ea03bf feat: run models through an operator's OpenAI- or Anthropic-compatible gateway
The model proxy always forwarded to api.openai.com and development runs gave
Codex no base URL or model, so a company model gateway could not be used.

- WF_OPENAI_BASE_URL points the production proxy (and development Codex runs)
  at an OpenAI-compatible gateway with the Responses API; WF_ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
  gives Claude Code an Anthropic-compatible one as ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL. Both are
  operator settings in the provider catalog, HTTPS without credentials
  (loopback HTTP outside production); an invalid gateway disables the proxy.
- Development credentials now carry the run's model, so WF_CODEX_DEFAULT_MODEL
  selects a model the gateway serves.
- tests/integration/real-model.test.ts (WF_REAL_MODEL_INTEGRATION=1, key from
  WF_TEST_MODEL_API_KEY) runs one wish through the real Codex executor, the
  verifier and integration into a local repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 22:28:33 +08:00
eust-w
1d75b03430 feat: register executors in one catalog and add Claude Code (FR-D1)
Adding an executor touched the contracts, the API's availability check, the
worker and the console separately. Now it is an adapter plus one entry in
@wishforge/contracts' providerCatalog (name, executable variable, whether the
model proxy isolates its credentials) and one in the worker's
providerRegistry; the API, the console's options and MCP's submit_wish read
the catalog, and a test checks every entry is registered with the worker.

The CodeBuddy adapter already parsed Claude-Code-style stream-json, so it is
now a StreamJsonCliAdapter with a dialect per CLI. Claude Code runs headless
with --verbose and --permission-mode bypassPermissions inside the per-run
sandbox and receives only ANTHROPIC_* credentials (WF_CLAUDE_BIN). Like
CodeBuddy it is development-only until the model proxy supports it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 20:23:05 +08:00
eust-w
ffa066dcf2 feat: remove run volumes after a retention period
Released generations kept their PVCs (and the local backend its run
directories) forever, filling the tenant quota.

- The API's hourly maintenance asks the provisioner to purge the volumes of
  every generation of a run once WF_RUN_STORAGE_RETENTION_HOURS (default a
  week, 0 keeps them) passed since the release, and records storagePurgedAt.
  Checkpoints live in the control plane, so continuing a run never needs them.
- POST /runs/purge deletes the run's PVCs by label (the local backend its
  directories) and answers busy while any of the run's pods or processes is
  active. The baseline Role gains list and delete on PVCs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 20:09:51 +08:00
eust-w
15e137ff7f feat: isolate tenants in Temporal with per-tenant namespaces and mutual TLS
Sandboxes can reach Temporal, which used to accept any client in one shared
namespace. Now:

- Every Temporal client (API dispatcher, coordinator, deployer, sandboxes) can
  present a client certificate (TEMPORAL_TLS_*); production refuses to start
  without one.
- TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE_PREFIX gives each tenant its own namespace: the dispatcher
  starts and signals a tenant's workflows there, the shared coordinator and
  deployer poll every served tenant's namespace with one workflow bundle, and a
  sandbox polls only its tenant's. Production refuses to serve several tenants
  through one namespace.
- The Kubernetes provisioner mounts the tenant's Temporal client certificate
  into executor and verifier pods (WF_RUN_TEMPORAL_TLS_SECRET, required in
  production); the local provisioner passes the TLS settings through.

Authorizing certificates per namespace remains Temporal server configuration;
the operations guide describes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 19:59:49 +08:00
eust-w
0bcfbc13dd feat(ide): push IDE work to ide/ branches and merge it through a verified wish
People's changes now reach the target branch the same way the agent's do. The
IDE credential carries a ref prefix and the Git service runs a pre-receive hook
on every push that refuses updates outside it, so the IDE can push only
`ide/` branches; the platform's own integration is unaffected.

- A wish may name a source branch. The run starts from that branch's head, the
  agent builds on it, and verification, repair rounds, merging onto a moved
  target and conflict repair work as before. A missing branch makes the run
  wait (git_storage) until it is pushed.
- Release risk is now computed from the target branch before integration, not
  from where the run started: a migration committed on the source branch would
  otherwise have been missed and could have skipped approval.
- Clones work on `ide/work`; a plain `git push` publishes it.
- The console lists a project's IDE branches with a button to submit a wish
  that merges one, and the new-wish form has a starting-point field; MCP
  `submit_wish` accepts `sourceBranch`. The Git service lists branches under
  a prefix for this (`POST /refs`).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 19:17:14 +08:00
eust-w
6d2dcebe65 feat(ide): clone the project into IDE workspaces and push back through Git (FR-H2)
While someone has a workspace open, the gateway asks the API for a 15-minute
write token for the project's platform repository on behalf of that person
(membership and role checked each time) and delivers it to the workspace
backend. The backend writes it to a Git config file outside the repository
(a memory volume in Kubernetes) that the clone includes, and on the first
delivery clones the target branch into a folder named after the project. The
workspace cannot mint credentials itself, so access ends with the last
session.

- People commit and push to the target branch like with any Git server; the
  platform only accepts fast-forwards, and the next wish starts from that
  commit (covered end to end in the local loop test).
- Commits are authored by whoever opened the latest session, from the name and
  email in their sign-in; their own git config overrides it.
- Only the gateway can reach the delivery endpoint: it needs Theia's
  connection token, and the gateway refuses the path for browsers.
- The provisioner pins the workspace to its repository and lets the pod reach
  the Git service; the Kubernetes baseline admits that traffic. External
  repositories are not cloned.
- The local shared Theia clones each project into its own folder.
- The Theia image installs Git, and its stage is named theia: the default
  build target of that Dockerfile is the gateway.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 18:52:37 +08:00
eust-w
ee2fbe9f6a fix: match the Kubernetes baseline to the provisioner and drop stale settings
The base manifests described a design the code does not have: a Role that only
allowed Jobs, an unused sandbox account, a tool gateway that does not exist and
a deployer bound into the sandbox namespace. They now grant exactly what the
provisioner applies and deletes for runs and IDE workspaces, let sandbox pods
reach the API, Temporal and Git through the control namespace's default deny,
and let the IDE gateway reach workspace pods.

- The API reads the runtime image from WF_RUN_WORKER_IMAGE only, the same name
  the provisioner uses; the WF_RUN_IMAGE alias is gone.
- The provisioner takes the public gateway origin from WF_IDE_PUBLIC_URL, which
  is what the gateway and API call it, and refuses to start without an explicit
  WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE.
- Environments no longer accept a runnerId that was always rejected.
- The Compose acceptance script uses the current Docker context unless
  WF_DOCKER_CONTEXT names one, instead of a hardcoded colima.
- Tests cover waiting reasons and their exits, and the production rejection of
  unsandboxed or unstated verification isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 18:01:28 +08:00
eust-w
b810423990 feat: show code changes, verification output and lessons in the console
- Runs: a per-file diff of the latest checkpoint, verification evidence with each
  command's exit code, duration and output tail (and failed installs), the last
  failure that the repair round works on, and the integrated commit when a
  project without delivery completes.
- Projects: repository status with a retry for platform repositories, the
  project's lessons (list, add a convention, disable, delete) and runs filtered
  on the server; IDE texts describe the Git hand-off instead of the removed
  save barrier.
- Releases: the approval dialog shows the requirement, project, target
  environment (production flagged), verification commands and approval deadline
  from a new review endpoint; failed releases say why. Environments locked by a
  deployment with an unknown outcome can be unlocked after a confirmation.
- Errors are titled by HTTP status; secondary text and focus rings meet the
  contrast requirements; the mobile drawer leaves the tab order when closed and
  closes on Esc.
- Sessions: the web BFF refreshes access tokens with the refresh token for up to
  12 hours; IDE gateway sessions are renewed while in use (idle timeout 15 min,
  at most 12 h) and rechecked by the granted user, so revocation still applies.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 17:01:30 +08:00
eust-w
0b4c09f7eb refactor: declare every entity field instead of an open index signature
Entity carried `[key: string]: unknown`, so a misspelt field compiled and most
records were read as untyped bags. Every stored kind now has an interface in
contracts (workspace, runner task and registration, provider connection,
checkpoint record, resource allocation, integration lease, delivery config) and
the project, run, release and evidence types list all their fields. Entity writes
are generic over the record type, and the project delivery settings no longer
accept a stray target branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 16:32:36 +08:00
eust-w
5aea9b73a9 fix: harden the control plane's storage, identities and recovery paths
- Storage: read-only queries use a read-only transaction without the tenant
  lock, so event streams and dashboards no longer queue behind writers; lists
  filter on indexed project, run and status fields and the run list pages with
  limit/before. Dispatchers claim outbox items with SKIP LOCKED and a claim
  deadline; delivered items and old idempotency records are pruned hourly.
- Migrations are versioned files recorded with checksums in schema_migrations;
  002 adds the claim column and run index and migrates preview-stage runs and
  free-text waiting reasons. Run events and usage are append-only for the app.
- Identities: static service tokens reach only their routes (coordinator: state,
  wait, repair; deployer: lease, transition, releases); the static verifier
  identity is gone; Git credentials go only to the lease holder; internal bodies
  are validated; framework and body-parser errors use the API error envelope.
- Quotas: only queued or running runs (or ones with an unsettled model request)
  hold token reservations; continuing a run reserves its remaining budget again.
- Recovery: owners can list and reconcile model requests with an unknown outcome,
  and requests whose proxy died are marked unknown; definite deployment failures
  free the environment, admins can unlock an environment after checking the
  target, approvals expire with their release, and production approvals need a
  second person. The builder's Docker context is operator configuration.
- MCP: list_projects, absolute console links, request_release resolves the run's
  evidence and default environment, and tool changes are audited as the user.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 16:16:47 +08:00
eust-w
a9411f586b feat: run the whole loop locally with a local provisioner
Local development had no provisioner, so every wish stopped at "sandbox not
ready", and dev:all started neither the coordinator nor the deployer.

- The provisioner moves from apps/ide to apps/provisioner and gains a backend
  switch: `local` starts an executor and a verifier process per run generation
  on this host (WF_SANDBOX_MODE=host, own directories and run-scoped tokens,
  development mode only) and points workspaces at the local Theia; `kubernetes`
  keeps the Kata Jobs, now started with the image entrypoint instead of the npm dev
  script and allowed to reach the platform Git service.
- In development the resource grant needs no runtime image digest.
- setup:local is one idempotent script that creates or completes .env.local,
  including the deployment mode, provisioner and grant settings.
- dev:all starts Git, API, provisioner, coordinator, deployer and web; dev:ide
  starts Theia and the IDE gateway; ide:install and ide:build wrap the separate
  Theia package. npm test also runs the provisioner tests.
- Project settings accept the target branch and dependency install commands.
- Web development conveniences require WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=development.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 15:36:12 +08:00
eust-w
cce214f8fb feat: close the main loop from wish to integrated commit
Verification ran git inside the tree under test, kept no command output and
treated every infrastructure fault as a test failure; repairs went through an
executor lease the coordinator should not hold; and a project without delivery
could never succeed. This reworks the worker execution path and the control-plane
contracts it depends on.

- Verification exports the exact commit to a directory without .git, installs
  dependencies (network allowed) and runs the protected commands under
  bubblewrap in kata mode or directly in host mode; evidence records exit code,
  duration, digest, a redacted output tail and the isolation used. Production
  rejects host evidence. A failed installation waits as infrastructure.
- Waiting reasons are an enum with a redacted detail; dispatcher, GitHub and
  model-proxy states map onto it, and the console explains each one with a way out.
- Repairs are requested by the coordinator through /internal/runs/:id/repair;
  the control plane derives the failure summary from the verifier's evidence and
  enforces the repair budget. Continuing after the budget is spent grants one more
  round; a new requirement revision starts a fresh budget.
- Execution identities may only move a run within their own stages and only to
  running or waiting; success comes from integration evidence (no delivery
  configured) or deployment acceptance. The unused preview stage is gone.
- Integration fast-forwards when the target has not moved, merges and re-verifies
  otherwise, retries when a push finds the target moved, and turns merge conflicts
  into a repair round that merges the current target for the agent to resolve.
- Successful runs that needed a repair leave a project lesson; active lessons are
  injected into later prompts, and admins can list, add, disable and delete them.
- Executor progress (messages, commands, file changes, plan updates) is stored as
  normalized events; previously agent messages were recorded as the literal word
  "output". Provider failures keep the work as a checkpoint and wait as
  provider_error instead of failing the run.
- Workers declare WF_SANDBOX_MODE=host|kata (host refused in production),
  heartbeat with retries until the lease could have expired, and retry safe
  control-plane reads with backoff.
- tests/local-loop.test.ts runs the loop end to end with real Git, the in-process
  control plane behind its internal routes and a scripted agent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 15:15:54 +08:00
eust-w
959f5e2063 fix: make integration pushes, checkpoints and command output work
- Integration caches are bare clones instead of mirrors. A mirror
  remote refuses explicit refspecs, so every push to the target branch
  or a GitHub review branch failed. Caches created by earlier versions
  are corrected (remote.origin.mirror=false) and the target ref is
  force-synchronised from the remote.
- Checkpoints bundle only the commits after their base (base..HEAD)
  instead of the full history, so repositories with real history no
  longer exceed the inline limit. Restoring clones the project
  repository for the base, verifies and applies the bundle, then checks
  the tree against the recorded patch. An unchanged workspace produces
  no bundle; patches are capped at 4 MiB.
- Git commands get a 10 minute default timeout instead of the generic
  120 s, which failed clones and pushes of larger repositories.
- Command output is decoded per stream with StringDecoder, so UTF-8
  characters split across chunks are no longer corrupted (this made
  executor/verifier patch digests disagree), and output accounting is
  incremental instead of quadratic.
- The Git service forwards Content-Encoding to http-backend; gzipped
  upload-pack negotiations previously failed with "bad line length".
- API JSON bodies: 16 MB for checkpoint uploads, 2 MB for the model
  proxy, 1 MB elsewhere (was 8 MB everywhere, before authentication).

Regression tests push a verified candidate through a fresh and a legacy
mirror cache and restore an incremental checkpoint from its repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 14:11:38 +08:00
eust-w
78ed117763 feat: make the deployment mode explicit and fail closed
Security-relevant behaviour (development tokens, loopback HTTP, inline
checkpoints, raw provider keys, optional verification profiles) was
keyed off NODE_ENV === 'production', so any deployment that forgot
NODE_ENV silently ran with development rules.

- @wishforge/contracts exports deploymentMode/isProduction/
  requireDeploymentMode. WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE wins; misspelled values and
  development combined with NODE_ENV=production are rejected; NODE_ENV
  remains a fallback only for libraries and tests.
- All API, runtime, artifact, Git service and operator-script checks use
  isProduction.
- The API, worker, Git service and Runner refuse to start without an
  explicit WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE; the IDE gateway treats anything other
  than an explicit development mode as production.
- The development seed loads .env.local before checking the mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 14:07:02 +08:00
eust-w
82d35a3708 fix: use one canonical JSON implementation for digests and signatures
The API signed Runner tasks with keys sorted by localeCompare, while the
runner verified with code-unit order; environment keys such as
API_URL/API2 or DB_HOST/DBA sort differently, so valid deployment tasks
were rejected with INVALID_SIGNATURE. A third copy lived in the agent
package.

canonicalJson now lives in @wishforge/contracts (code-unit key order,
undefined properties omitted, non-JSON values rejected) and is used by
the API digest, Runner task signing/verification, the runner's state
digest and agent bundle digests. Binding digests computed by the old
locale-dependent order may differ, so releases requested before this
change must be requested again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 14:04:36 +08:00
eust-w
b90db2cc6f refactor: remove dead code and typecheck the test suite
- Drop the WorkBuddy Cloud executor stub: it always reported
  "unverified" and could never run. WorkBuddy remains an MCP client for
  submitting wishes. Providers are now codex and codebuddy; an unknown
  provider waits with an explicit reason instead of a fake adapter.
- Remove internal routes nobody calls (/internal/releases/:id/begin,
  /accept, /failure and /internal/workspaces/:id/provisioned) with
  their domain methods, the never-consumed release.ready and
  release.rollback outbox events, an unreachable idempotency branch,
  dead helpers in runtime/deploy.ts and an unused RunnerBroker
  dependency.
- Enable noUnusedLocals in the base and web TypeScript configs; the
  runtime package now extends the base config.
- Add tests/tsconfig.json and include it in `npm run typecheck`. This
  surfaced tests still calling the deleted begin/accept path (now
  exercised through the Runner protocol) and five latent type errors.
- Web: provider capability labels match the API's keys and the wish
  form disables unavailable providers.
- Delete the invalid example Runner Job manifest; stop tracking the
  generated apps/web/next-env.d.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 14:02:27 +08:00