Brings the branch up to the current base (executor settings, project
skills, Chinese run messages, cloud IDE removal, wish attachments) and
resolves the ten conflicted files, keeping both sides:
- wish-refiner: the tenant's executor settings pick the models first,
then the Copilot model setting; the tenant credential still goes
before the operator's login
- worker providers: executor settings apply, and a run with its own
credential still gets an empty home
- main.ts: Copilot screenshot uploads and wish attachments each keep
their own body limit
- contracts, http, web types: default budget and skill auto-activation,
Copilot and attachment entity kinds, ./text and ./attachments exports
- globals.css: Copilot styles and attachment styles, one after the other
- tests: the canceled-release reason is Chinese; the refiner's default
models have no [1m] suffix, as this branch names them
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Running the local console with WF_WEB_SERVE_MODE=production starts Next.js with NODE_ENV=production, which previously disabled development sign-in even when WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=development was explicitly set. Keep the deployment-mode gate explicit, forward the console's auth and API variables from scripts/dev.mjs, narrow the Temporal worker grace-time literal for TypeScript, and ignore local AGENTS.md instructions.
Ten ways a customer, a page or a log line may try to make the Copilot hand over
what it must not: a key, the connection string, the system prompt, a kubeconfig.
Where a mock model leaks, the platform still refuses; where it obeys an
injected instruction, the prompt already says a document is data, not a command.
The tool layer is tested separately: an environment file is refused even when
the model names it, and logs outside the project's namespaces are refused.
Screenshot acceptance is prepared, not faked: the fixtures directory explains
what to put there, and the test runs only when an operator does, against the
real gateway.
Model names stored with a context suffix are rewritten by a dry-run-by-default
script (the local database currently has no projects), and the console calls
/providers what it is: 模型连接.
The cluster never ran Theia or the IDE gateway, so every workspace stayed
"未配置" forever. The feature is gone instead of half-present:
- API: workspace, launch and lifecycle endpoints, the gateway identity and
its internal routes, the dispatcher's workspace provisioning and the
lifecycle worker. Migration 003 deletes stored workspaces and settles
their pending outbox items.
- Provisioner: workspace provisioning and lifecycle for both backends.
- Web: the 云 IDE panel, the launch route, the start-branch picker that
listed IDE branches, and the workspace count on usage.
- apps/ide, infra/oct, dev:ide and the CI job; IDE parts of local k3s,
network policies, RBAC, docs and the architecture diagram.
A wish can still start from a pushed branch through the API (sourceBranch).
Plan files and stored entitlements may still carry maxWorkspaces; it is
accepted and ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lessons become skills with a category (workflow / pitfall / convention):
one model, one prompt section, one permission rule. A repaired failure
records or updates a pitfall skill deduplicated by failure signature;
harvest sees every skill and may merge into an existing one; corroborated
skills auto-activate per project (skillAutoActivation, default on).
Runs given a skill are counted (skill_usage); platform-maintained skills
retire after 3 failing runs in a row or 90 days unused. Skills can be
imported from SKILL.md / zip, copied between projects and searched across
projects. Migration 004 converts existing lesson rows to skills.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flash gets 180 s to finish the structured JSON. If it times out or the
JSON does not parse, the same request is tried again with deepseek-pro.
The console proxy waits long enough for both attempts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A table test that names its case with a 16–32 hex id (an org, a token)
fails as a different string at the start commit and after the change.
The baseline then treats that case as new, so a frontend-only wish
cannot pass Go tests that were already red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tests that run again at the commit a run started from get that
commit in a repository of their own, checked out, with the same origin:
a test that needs Git no longer fails there only for want of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Checks run in a repository of their own holding only the commit (and
the commit the run started from, as refs/wishforge/base), so code that
asks Git which commit it is gets the true answer; the verifier's
repository and configuration stay out of reach
- A frontend test gets two minutes before it fails, instead of one that
never settles holding the whole suite until the check is killed
- When frontend or Go tests fail, the same tests run at the commit the
run started from; only failures that were not there before fail the
change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Skills: per-project know-how the platform proposes from each succeeded
run (in the background, or on request from a run), people confirm,
edit, disable, delete or write; active ones enter later prompts
- Export one skill as SKILL.md, or all as a zip with a directory per
skill, as .claude/skills/ expects
- A wish's report: every run, its stage timeline, the agent's plan,
replies, commands, changed files and model usage, the change, the
checks, failures, reviews and releases, and the full event log, as
Markdown, or laid out for printing to PDF
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The cluster's settings come only from the operator inputs kept in
.wishforge/cluster-poc (carried keys, signing key, plans, profiles,
host keys); the Mac's .env.local and service files are no longer read
- restore puts back one of the node's snapshots inside the cluster: the
files are checked against the manifest before anything is emptied, the
backup container restores the database, row counts decide
- Snapshots also keep Fanyu's Runner records
- Remove migrate, the Mac backup copy and its launchd job, and the Mac
public entry (frp gateway) code and manifests
- Mark the Mac operating guides as retired
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Profiles pin each environment: POC (branch poc) and Fanyu (branch dev,
180.76.138.88, droboticflow-fanyu), with their Deployments by UID
- Releases expect every Deployment of their profile; Fanyu's api image
also runs its annotation processor and validator, each rolled back to
its own image
- Bindings may list several projects; each Runner has its own settings
- fanyu-access: least-privilege identity and build-Pod admission policy in
Fanyu's cluster, its token only in the executor and Fanyu's Runner
- projects --replace: delete every project with all it holds, then create
the POC and Fanyu projects, their environments and Runners
- Ship the Runner's public keys in the ConfigMap, not a Mac path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- cluster-poc.mjs: image (in-cluster Kaniko), bootstrap, secrets, apply,
migrate --rehearsal|--final, public HTTPS entry, backup and restore
- One restricted Pod (platform, executor, Runner, PostgreSQL, Temporal,
MinIO, Caddy, backup) listening only on loopback except Caddy
- Protected checks run in per-workspace check Pods; cancellation during
start-up now always removes them
- Daily snapshots on the node (consistent dump with row counts, Temporal
online backup), copied to the Mac by launchd with SHA-256 checks and a
notification on failure; restore verified on the rehearsal copy
- Downloads and uploads survive the Mac's lossy link to the cluster
- Local public entry, evidence isolation labels, acceptance records
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
doctor only looked at the local services. A POC run also needs the
cluster API to build and deploy, the Gitea branch to start from and
push to, the public application to accept a release on, the Claude CLI
and room on the disk; when one of them was down, doctor still said
ready, and a wish found out minutes later, at its build.
doctor now checks them read only, without a model call: the cluster's
readiness, the branch head as builds read it and as integration reaches
it over the operator's SSH login, the build commit the application
reports and whether it is the branch head, the CLI's version and the
free space where runs live. A failing one is named with the first line
of its error and makes the report degraded. start does not wait on
them, so a network problem cannot hold up starting the service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the development host mode, protected checks and dependency
installations ran directly as the operator. They run the agent's code:
a test it wrote could read the home directory's secrets, reach the
network, or plant Git configuration that the trusted Git commands after
it would execute.
With WF_HOST_CHECK_SANDBOX=true they run under Seatbelt instead. File
contents in the home directory are unreadable except the command's own
directory and the paths the operator lists; it may write only there,
in the caches the operator lists and in a temporary directory of its
own, never in a .git directory. Only installations reach the network;
checks may use loopback ports by opt-in, for test suites that start
local servers. The platform's own ports (control plane, Temporal and
its web UI, database, object storage, provisioner, Git service, IDE,
console) stay blocked in any case: the local start lists them from
their configured addresses. Checks get no answer from the keychain,
and a command whose home is the executor's (holding its credentials)
gets a private one. A sandbox that cannot start leaves the run waiting
on infrastructure; verification evidence records checkSandbox.
scripts/check-host-check-sandbox.ts checks all of this on the target
Mac, from outside the sandbox, then runs the POC's installation and
checks sandboxed on a recent droboticflow source. Enabled on the local
POC, a real wish passed through both, including a repair round for the
agent's own failing tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every protected web build archived the build it replaced and never
removed one, at 50 to 200 MB each: the local POC had collected 284 MB
in three backups. A successful build now keeps the build it replaced,
which the receipt names as the rollback target, one earlier build and
the newest failed build; the receipt lists what it removed. Removal is
best effort: a directory it cannot remove waits for the next build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- In development sign-in the web proxy attached the development token
to every request, and reads carry no Origin check: a page that
rebinds its own domain to 127.0.0.1 could read the API as the
development user. The token now goes only to requests whose Host is
this machine or the configured public URL.
- Without THEIA_HOSTS, Theia only checks that a WebSocket's Origin
matches its Host, which such a page satisfies, terminals included.
The local IDE now allows only the address the gateway uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- It allowed every IPv4 address of the en* interfaces as a web origin,
public ones included; it now takes only private LAN addresses, as
npm run local:network does.
- It rewrote .env.local in place, where a crash lost the generated
secrets, and missed `export` assignments; the file is now replaced
atomically through scripts/env-file.mjs.
- A binding file it could not read made it create a second project
and environment; only a missing one means a first setup now.
- A runner registered for a replaced environment is registered again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Eight wrong passwords from anywhere on the network locked the only
local administrator out for fifteen minutes, again and again. The
password is 256 random bits, so the limit only has to bound the
scrypt work: after eight failures, checks are spaced two seconds
apart, globally, and a burst cannot run them at once.
- The launcher let the Next.js development server listen on the LAN,
handing every visitor its source maps and hot-reload channel. Only
the production build may now listen beyond loopback. A listener
bound to one address is also checked for readiness there, and the
banner shows the configured port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stopping dev.mjs sent SIGTERM to each service and moved on, so a slow
service, or anything a service spawned (run workers, Next.js workers),
outlived it once the supervisor killed dev.mjs after 20 seconds. The
next start then found the old API answering and reused it: a rebuild
kept running old code.
- Each service runs in its own process group. Stopping signals the
group, waits up to 10 seconds, then kills what remains.
- Under the LaunchAgent supervisor, a service already answering is
refused instead of adopted (WF_LOCAL_REUSE_SERVICES=false).
- npm test, and so CI, now runs scripts/*.test.mjs. The POC check test
that needs the Mac's Homebrew toolchain skips where there is none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_SANDBOX=true, Claude Code also gets Bash, run in
its built-in sandbox through --settings:
- The sandbox must start (failIfUnavailable), and no command may run
outside it (allowUnsandboxedCommands: false).
- No network: an empty allowedDomains with strictAllowlist, since an
absent allowlist leaves the network open. Local binding stays off,
because it would also open every local port, Temporal's included.
- Commands cannot read the home directories, the CLI's home or the
worker's own directory, except the workspace, a per-run scratch
directory and WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_READ_PATHS; they write only to the
workspace and the scratch directory; credential variables are unset.
- WF_CLAUDE_COMMAND_ENV gives commands toolchain variables, such as the
POC's read-only Go module cache.
The executor probes the sandbox first (Seatbelt on macOS; bubblewrap
and socat on Linux) and keeps file tools only where it cannot start,
saying so on the timeline. The adapter now writes the execution
contract into the prompt, for the tools the agent actually has.
scripts/check-claude-command-sandbox.ts checks a machine with one short
real session and judges each probe by its effect, not the agent's
account. On the local Mac every probe was blocked; the login keychain
remains reachable, because Claude Code's Seatbelt profile always allows
the security server. That limit is documented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reproduce and fix the launchd SIGTERMed shutdown race; wait for owned processes to exit and report timeouts. Describe local task workspaces without claiming OS isolation.
Detect actual service and Runner readiness, restore LAN access after network changes, protect production web builds with rollback, honor cancellation during executor startup, and show truthful cached-data and credential states.
Add authenticated LAN access, native Claude execution, checkpoint and budget recovery, and signed POC build/deploy/rollback contracts. Include local service management, regression coverage, and evidence from the completed POC delivery.
Repeated builds grew the VM's disk to 63 GB, until the Mac's disk was
full. Writes inside the VM then failed and its file systems broke.
- The service image installed dependencies after copying every source
file, so each source change rebuilt a 750 MB layer, five images at a
time. It now installs from the workspace manifests first, and a test
keeps every workspace listed.
- The VM's disk defaults to 40 GiB instead of 80.
- `up` refuses to create the VM when the Mac has less free space than
that, and `build` refuses below 15 GiB free.
- After building, superseded images are pruned and the build cache is
capped at 10 GB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The local cluster deploys the IDE gateway, and the provisioner creates a
Theia workspace with an OCT sidecar per project in the tenant namespace.
`build` adds the ide, ide-gateway and oct-workspace images; `web`
forwards the workbench (3100) and the gateway (3101).
- On a local development cluster (WF_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP), the
provisioner accepts the in-cluster HTTP platform Git and the localhost
gateway for workspaces.
- Builds use a proxy from the host environment, at the address the VM
sees the host at.
- `web` refuses ports already taken on the host, where kubectl would
otherwise listen on ::1 only. Its defaults stay clear of the local
development stack (3000, 4400).
- Pods reading the settings or secrets carry a digest of them, so a
redeploy with changed settings rolls them.
- The IDE build context leaves out every local node_modules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The local cluster runs the workbench next to the API. It is a development
build of the web, from the image's new WEB_BUILD=development argument:
- Next.js inlines NODE_ENV into production builds.
- Development sign-in therefore exists only in development builds, and
production images never carry it.
`node scripts/k3s-local.mjs web` forwards it to http://localhost:3000. The
web refuses changes from any origin but its WF_PUBLIC_URL, so that address
is set at deploy time (WF_K3S_WEB_PORT). `build` now also takes the images
to rebuild, for example `build web`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first runs on k3s found these problems; a wish now goes from submission
through the Codex executor, independent verification and integration in
per-run pods.
- Development deployments refused to start because the images set
NODE_ENV=production. The local manifest and the sandbox Jobs now set
NODE_ENV to the deployment mode.
- The model proxy treated x-client-request-id as a per-request idempotency
key. Codex sends its conversation id there, so every second request of a
session failed with 409. Only Idempotency-Key names a single request now.
- Codex's command sandbox (bubblewrap) cannot start in a runc pod. Every
command failed and the agent retried until the budget ran out. The
executor now probes the sandbox before starting Codex. A Kata sandbox that
cannot run it waits as PROVIDER_SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. A development (host)
sandbox runs Codex without it, and the timeline records that.
- The prompt asked agents to commit, but Codex keeps .git read-only and the
platform commits the checkpoint itself. Agents now leave their changes
uncommitted, and get the platform's Git identity if they commit anyway. A
resolved merge is recorded even when its tree equals HEAD.
- scripts/k3s-local.mjs:
- excludes the VM and cluster ranges from a host proxy (NO_PROXY);
- uses its own Docker client configuration, so a stale credential
helper does not break builds;
- recovers from an interrupted k3s install;
- reports when Colima switches the current kubectl or Docker context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
infra/k8s/local describes a development cluster in a Colima VM: PostgreSQL,
Temporal, the platform Git service, the API (migrating and seeding in init
containers), the coordinator and deployer workers, and the Kubernetes
provisioner with a service-account kubeconfig, a Role in the tenant namespace
and a default-deny policy there. Wishes run in per-run pods under the
provisioner's network policies, and models are reached through the API's
run-scoped proxy and the configured gateway.
scripts/k3s-local.mjs starts the VM and a local registry, builds and pushes the
images by digest, renders the manifest with generated secrets kept in
.wishforge/k3s, stores the gateway key over stdin, and runs a smoke wish. Every
command names the colima-wishforge context, never the current one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sandbox Jobs never received WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE, which every worker requires
before anything else, so each Kubernetes sandbox exited at start. The
provisioner now passes its own mode.
A local development cluster (k3s) has no Kata, no bubblewrap inside runc and no
TLS between services. For it, and only with WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=development:
- WF_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true lets services reach each other over plain HTTP
(Git, the model proxy, the provisioner and IDE gateway targets, the worker's
control-plane client); production refuses the setting outright.
- The provisioner accepts WF_RUN_SANDBOX_MODE=host and WF_KATA_RUNTIME_CLASS=none
and passes the HTTP settings to its sandboxes.
- The development seed is built into the image (dist/api/seed.mjs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adding an executor touched the contracts, the API's availability check, the
worker and the console separately. Now it is an adapter plus one entry in
@wishforge/contracts' providerCatalog (name, executable variable, whether the
model proxy isolates its credentials) and one in the worker's
providerRegistry; the API, the console's options and MCP's submit_wish read
the catalog, and a test checks every entry is registered with the worker.
The CodeBuddy adapter already parsed Claude-Code-style stream-json, so it is
now a StreamJsonCliAdapter with a dialect per CLI. Claude Code runs headless
with --verbose and --permission-mode bypassPermissions inside the per-run
sandbox and receives only ANTHROPIC_* credentials (WF_CLAUDE_BIN). Like
CodeBuddy it is development-only until the model proxy supports it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/build-services.mjs compiles the API, its migration runner, the worker,
the Runner and the platform Git service into single ESM files under dist/.
Workspace packages are compiled in, everything else loads from node_modules,
and esbuild applies the transform tsx applied before, so behaviour does not
change. The Temporal workflow bundle is built at the same time and the worker
uses it when present instead of bundling at start-up.
The runtime image builds the services and runs dist/*/main.mjs; the
Kubernetes provisioner starts sandboxes with dist/worker/main.mjs, and
migrations run as node dist/api/migrate.mjs. esbuild is now a declared dev
dependency. A test builds everything and checks that each entry point loads
all its imports and reaches its own configuration checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sandboxes can reach Temporal, which used to accept any client in one shared
namespace. Now:
- Every Temporal client (API dispatcher, coordinator, deployer, sandboxes) can
present a client certificate (TEMPORAL_TLS_*); production refuses to start
without one.
- TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE_PREFIX gives each tenant its own namespace: the dispatcher
starts and signals a tenant's workflows there, the shared coordinator and
deployer poll every served tenant's namespace with one workflow bundle, and a
sandbox polls only its tenant's. Production refuses to serve several tenants
through one namespace.
- The Kubernetes provisioner mounts the tenant's Temporal client certificate
into executor and verifier pods (WF_RUN_TEMPORAL_TLS_SECRET, required in
production); the local provisioner passes the TLS settings through.
Authorizing certificates per namespace remains Temporal server configuration;
the operations guide describes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While someone has a workspace open, the gateway asks the API for a 15-minute
write token for the project's platform repository on behalf of that person
(membership and role checked each time) and delivers it to the workspace
backend. The backend writes it to a Git config file outside the repository
(a memory volume in Kubernetes) that the clone includes, and on the first
delivery clones the target branch into a folder named after the project. The
workspace cannot mint credentials itself, so access ends with the last
session.
- People commit and push to the target branch like with any Git server; the
platform only accepts fast-forwards, and the next wish starts from that
commit (covered end to end in the local loop test).
- Commits are authored by whoever opened the latest session, from the name and
email in their sign-in; their own git config overrides it.
- Only the gateway can reach the delivery endpoint: it needs Theia's
connection token, and the gateway refuses the path for browsers.
- The provisioner pins the workspace to its repository and lets the pod reach
the Git service; the Kubernetes baseline admits that traffic. External
repositories are not cloned.
- The local shared Theia clones each project into its own folder.
- The Theia image installs Git, and its stage is named theia: the default
build target of that Dockerfile is the gateway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Storage: read-only queries use a read-only transaction without the tenant
lock, so event streams and dashboards no longer queue behind writers; lists
filter on indexed project, run and status fields and the run list pages with
limit/before. Dispatchers claim outbox items with SKIP LOCKED and a claim
deadline; delivered items and old idempotency records are pruned hourly.
- Migrations are versioned files recorded with checksums in schema_migrations;
002 adds the claim column and run index and migrates preview-stage runs and
free-text waiting reasons. Run events and usage are append-only for the app.
- Identities: static service tokens reach only their routes (coordinator: state,
wait, repair; deployer: lease, transition, releases); the static verifier
identity is gone; Git credentials go only to the lease holder; internal bodies
are validated; framework and body-parser errors use the API error envelope.
- Quotas: only queued or running runs (or ones with an unsettled model request)
hold token reservations; continuing a run reserves its remaining budget again.
- Recovery: owners can list and reconcile model requests with an unknown outcome,
and requests whose proxy died are marked unknown; definite deployment failures
free the environment, admins can unlock an environment after checking the
target, approvals expire with their release, and production approvals need a
second person. The builder's Docker context is operator configuration.
- MCP: list_projects, absolute console links, request_release resolves the run's
evidence and default environment, and tool changes are audited as the user.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Local development had no provisioner, so every wish stopped at "sandbox not
ready", and dev:all started neither the coordinator nor the deployer.
- The provisioner moves from apps/ide to apps/provisioner and gains a backend
switch: `local` starts an executor and a verifier process per run generation
on this host (WF_SANDBOX_MODE=host, own directories and run-scoped tokens,
development mode only) and points workspaces at the local Theia; `kubernetes`
keeps the Kata Jobs, now started with the image entrypoint instead of the npm dev
script and allowed to reach the platform Git service.
- In development the resource grant needs no runtime image digest.
- setup:local is one idempotent script that creates or completes .env.local,
including the deployment mode, provisioner and grant settings.
- dev:all starts Git, API, provisioner, coordinator, deployer and web; dev:ide
starts Theia and the IDE gateway; ide:install and ide:build wrap the separate
Theia package. npm test also runs the provisioner tests.
- Project settings accept the target branch and dependency install commands.
- Web development conveniences require WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=development.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security-relevant behaviour (development tokens, loopback HTTP, inline
checkpoints, raw provider keys, optional verification profiles) was
keyed off NODE_ENV === 'production', so any deployment that forgot
NODE_ENV silently ran with development rules.
- @wishforge/contracts exports deploymentMode/isProduction/
requireDeploymentMode. WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE wins; misspelled values and
development combined with NODE_ENV=production are rejected; NODE_ENV
remains a fallback only for libraries and tests.
- All API, runtime, artifact, Git service and operator-script checks use
isProduction.
- The API, worker, Git service and Runner refuse to start without an
explicit WF_DEPLOYMENT_MODE; the IDE gateway treats anything other
than an explicit development mode as production.
- The development seed loads .env.local before checking the mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The IDE carried a second, Theia-internal coordination system: multi-
client save barriers, a hash-chained snapshot store, IndexedDB draft
recovery, transferable debugger-control leases that intercepted
Theia's plugin RPC, Ed25519 actor assertions from the gateway, and an
API gate that blocked every agent integration while any IDE workspace
was open until a human imported a coordinated snapshot. It depended on
Theia internals, made F5 debugging require five environment variables
plus a gateway-signed header, and stalled agent runs. IDE and agents
now hand off through Git commits (docs/architecture.md ADR-7).
- Delete apps/ide/coordination, apps/ide/security, the policy
extension's coordination/draft/DAP-guard/lifecycle-safety modules and
the unused product.json; the policy extension keeps only the managed
extension allow-list and scoped collaboration.
- API: workspace snapshot import/match/check routes are gone. The
project integration lease (one integrating run per project, fenced)
moves to domain/integration-lease.ts and is still enforced on
integrate/build transitions and build evidence.
- Workspace lifecycle: pause/resume no longer requires a save barrier;
automatic sleep needs 30 idle minutes and zero gateway connections,
which the gateway now reports itself. The lifecycle/integration
authorize relays and the gateway's assertion signing are removed;
gateway edit roles match the contract roles.
- Worker: no snapshot matching, workspace-input gate or local lock
file during integration; runtime workspace-snapshot is removed.
- Web: the snapshot import panel is removed from run detail.
- Provisioner workspaces no longer mount coordination state or the
gateway public key; local setup no longer generates gateway keys.
The local Theia build under apps/ide/lib must be rebuilt to pick up the
slimmer policy extension.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The invoice/settlement flow produced statements whose every monetary
field was null, behind a review/settle/void ceremony. Model charges are
billed by the provider directly, so the platform only needs to report
measured usage.
- apps/api/src/domain/usage.ts replaces billing.ts: per-month usage
lines, totals, model-measurement coverage and a formula-safe CSV
export. No invoice digest, settlement records or billing entities.
- Routes: GET /v1/usage/lines and /v1/usage/export (owner/admin),
GET /v1/plans; platform-operator actions move to
POST /v1/admin/members and /v1/admin/executions/:id/reconcile.
The operator allow-list is now WF_OPERATOR_SUBJECTS.
- Contracts: UsageLine replaces BillingUsageLine/BillingInvoice; the
billing_event and billing_period entity kinds are removed.
- Web usage page shows limits, occupancy, monthly totals and lines.
- npm script tenant:invite is renamed tenant:create (it provisions a
tenant).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The meta-evolution machinery (failure clustering meta-tasks, signed
offline evaluation, shadow/canary stages, external release receipts,
evaluator identity and its UI) could never take effect: promotions were
written to the system tenant only, the benchmark/runner/observer it
depended on did not exist, and its statistical gates were effectively
unreachable. It is removed as agreed in docs/requirements.md section 3.
What remains is the part every run actually uses, now explicit:
- packages/evolution becomes packages/agent and keeps only the bundle
schema, content digest and prompt assembly; consumers import it as the
@wishforge/agent workspace package instead of by relative path.
- apps/api/src/domain/agent-bundles.ts: immutable, content-addressed
agent configurations per tenant, with create, activate and rollback
restricted to human owners/admins. A run pins the active version at
submission; later activations never change it.
- /v1/agent-bundles routes replace /v1/evolution*; all /internal
evolution routes, the evaluator service token and the rsi:rollout
script are gone.
- Web: the experiment page becomes an "Agent 配置" page.
- Tests for the deleted modules are removed; control-plane tests cover
version pinning, rollback and authorization.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds prettier 3.9.8 (exact) with a shared config (single quotes,
120 columns, trailing commas), .prettierignore, .editorconfig and the
`format` / `format:check` scripts, then formats all TypeScript,
JavaScript, CSS, JSON and YAML sources.
Purely mechanical: no behaviour change. Typecheck passes, the vitest
suite and the 74 IDE node tests produce the same results as before
(socket-binding tests still cannot run inside this sandbox).
Previously the longest source line was ~3000 characters; reviewing the
following semantic changes now produces readable diffs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Imports the previously untracked working tree as-is so that the review
changes that follow (requirements -> design -> implementation) can be
reviewed as diffs and reverted if needed. No content changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>