wyuc 0bab621e09
harden input validation and outbound URL handling (#1387)
* harden input validation and outbound URL handling

- Validate the classroom id on the write path with the same allowlist the
  read path already applies, and assert in the storage layer that a resolved
  classroom file stays inside CLASSROOMS_DIR.
- Apply validateUrlForSSRF at every call site regardless of NODE_ENV; the
  guard already owns the ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORKS escape hatch, so the extra
  environment condition only disabled the check outside production builds.
  Add a repository-scanning test so a gated call site cannot reappear.
- Re-validate every redirect hop of an outbound provider request through a
  shared transport, mirroring the per-hop loop proxy-media already uses.
- Restrict stored slide HTML to the formatting vocabulary the renderer
  produces, sanitizing at the classroom persistence boundary on both write
  and read, with a separate policy for KaTeX snapshots.
- Refuse the development persistence authenticator under NODE_ENV=production
  unless an explicit opt-in is set, and document it in .env.example.

* drop credential headers on a cross-origin redirect hop

The manual redirect loop reused the caller's init on every hop, so provider
credentials were re-sent to the redirect target even on a different origin.
The platform fetch drops Authorization itself when it follows redirects, so
mirror that: strip authorization, api-key, x-api-key and x-goog-api-key
before a cross-origin hop, matching case-insensitively and preserving the
shape of the caller's headers. Same-origin hops are untouched.

A streaming request body cannot be replayed onto the next hop, so fail with
a clear message rather than sending an empty body.

---------

Co-authored-by: wyuc <dhq1024@proton.me>
2026-09-05 23:56:37 -07:00

108 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* DEVELOPMENT-ONLY authentication for the embedded persistence route.
*
* The token is NOT a secret: NEXT_PUBLIC_PERSISTENCE_TOKEN is compiled into
* the public browser bundle, so it is fully visible to every visitor and
* provides no confidentiality and no user isolation — anyone who can load the
* page can read and write EVERY learner partition and all documents by
* supplying an arbitrary x-learner-key. Its only purpose is to keep unrelated
* network scanners out of a trusted-network endpoint. Suitable only for
* localhost or trusted-network, single-user deployments. Production must
* replace this module with real session verification and derive learner
* identity from server-controlled claims.
*/
import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import type { IncomingMessage } from 'node:http';
import type { AssetPrincipal } from '@openmaic/storage';
import type { RuntimeHttpPrincipal } from '@openmaic/storage/server';
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger';
const log = createLogger('PersistenceAuth');
type PersistencePrincipal = RuntimeHttpPrincipal & Partial<Pick<AssetPrincipal, 'key'>>;
/**
* The single asset partition for this deployment shape. Documents have no
* ownership partition; assets get the same treatment until real auth lands.
*/
const SHARED_ASSET_PRINCIPAL = 'shared';
/**
* Whether the operator explicitly opted the development authenticator into
* production traffic (PERSISTENCE_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_AUTH=true/1). Both the
* startup warning and the runtime gate read the same opt-in through this one
* helper so the two copies of the parsing cannot drift.
*/
function insecureDevAuthOptInEnabled(): boolean {
const optIn = process.env.PERSISTENCE_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_AUTH;
return optIn === 'true' || optIn === '1';
}
/**
* The development authenticator must never serve production traffic unless the
* operator explicitly accepts the trade-off. This module provides no user
* isolation, so production defaults to refusing it entirely (returns undefined,
* which callers turn into a 401); PERSISTENCE_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_AUTH=true is
* the documented opt-in for trusted-network single-user deployments.
*/
function devAuthenticatorAllowedInCurrentEnvironment(): boolean {
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production') return true;
return insecureDevAuthOptInEnabled();
}
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && insecureDevAuthOptInEnabled()) {
log.warn(
'Persistence is running the development authenticator in production: it provides no user ' +
'isolation, so this endpoint must only be reachable on a trusted network. Replace it with ' +
'real session verification before serving public traffic.',
);
}
function singleHeader(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {
return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
}
function secureEqual(left: string, right: string): boolean {
const leftDigest = createHash('sha256').update(left).digest();
const rightDigest = createHash('sha256').update(right).digest();
return timingSafeEqual(leftDigest, rightDigest);
}
function authenticatePersistenceCredentials(
authorization: string | undefined,
learnerKey: string | undefined,
): PersistencePrincipal | undefined {
if (!devAuthenticatorAllowedInCurrentEnvironment()) return undefined;
const token = process.env.PERSISTENCE_DEV_TOKEN;
if (!token || !authorization || !secureEqual(authorization, `Bearer ${token}`)) return undefined;
// Documents are stored without any ownership partition, so assets are
// stored under one shared principal to match: this authenticator provides
// no user isolation either way (the header is client-supplied), and a
// per-header asset partition only meant a converted document's assets
// became unreadable to every other browser the document was shared with.
// The learner key still partitions runtime sessions, which are genuinely
// per-learner state. Production replaces this module with real session
// verification and derives both from server-controlled claims.
return { key: SHARED_ASSET_PRINCIPAL, ...(learnerKey ? { learnerKey } : {}) };
}
export function authenticatePersistenceHeaders(headers: Headers): PersistencePrincipal | undefined {
return authenticatePersistenceCredentials(
headers.get('authorization') ?? undefined,
headers.get('x-learner-key') ?? undefined,
);
}
export async function authenticatePersistenceRequest(
req: IncomingMessage,
): Promise<PersistencePrincipal | undefined> {
return authenticatePersistenceCredentials(
singleHeader(req.headers.authorization),
singleHeader(req.headers['x-learner-key']),
);
}