* harden input validation and outbound URL handling
- Validate the classroom id on the write path with the same allowlist the
read path already applies, and assert in the storage layer that a resolved
classroom file stays inside CLASSROOMS_DIR.
- Apply validateUrlForSSRF at every call site regardless of NODE_ENV; the
guard already owns the ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORKS escape hatch, so the extra
environment condition only disabled the check outside production builds.
Add a repository-scanning test so a gated call site cannot reappear.
- Re-validate every redirect hop of an outbound provider request through a
shared transport, mirroring the per-hop loop proxy-media already uses.
- Restrict stored slide HTML to the formatting vocabulary the renderer
produces, sanitizing at the classroom persistence boundary on both write
and read, with a separate policy for KaTeX snapshots.
- Refuse the development persistence authenticator under NODE_ENV=production
unless an explicit opt-in is set, and document it in .env.example.
* drop credential headers on a cross-origin redirect hop
The manual redirect loop reused the caller's init on every hop, so provider
credentials were re-sent to the redirect target even on a different origin.
The platform fetch drops Authorization itself when it follows redirects, so
mirror that: strip authorization, api-key, x-api-key and x-goog-api-key
before a cross-origin hop, matching case-insensitively and preserving the
shape of the caller's headers. Same-origin hops are untouched.
A streaming request body cannot be replayed onto the next hop, so fail with
a clear message rather than sending an empty body.
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Co-authored-by: wyuc <dhq1024@proton.me>