forked from longtao.wu/droboticflow
55 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Decisions and external prerequisites
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## Frozen decisions
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- Name/commands/packages/services: `drosync`.
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- Implementation: Go control plane and Rust client.
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- Direction: local to BOS only.
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- Conflict: automatic keep-both; never alter the original after a failed conditional commit.
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- BOS capability: fail closed until probed; do not auto-enable bucket versioning and do not rely on `x-bce-forbid-overwrite`.
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- Shared-prefix update: both technical conditional-update capability and administrator exclusivity confirmation are mandatory.
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- Credentials: long-lived device token until administrator revocation.
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- Existing Mongo BOS AK/SK representation remains, with the residual risk explicitly accepted.
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- Network: public direct access only in v1.
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## External prerequisites that source code cannot satisfy
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- Windows Authenticode certificate/private key.
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- Apple Developer ID, installer identity, notarization profile, and Apple runner.
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- Linux GPG/package signing key.
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- CI runners for all three target operating systems.
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- `droboticflow` POC namespace, registry secret, Mongo secret, and dedicated BOS acceptance credential.
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- A cost-approved window for >5 GB copy, 1 TiB, and 20 TiB real BOS certification.
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- A dedicated Ed25519 audit/update signing key in the production key vault.
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These are release gates, not implementation defaults. Private keys must never enter Git.
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## D-08 decision gate
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Until a real BOS probe supplies evidence:
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1. unprobed/unsupported spaces cannot accept sessions;
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2. conditional-create success permits only create;
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3. conditional update plus conditional multipart completion and explicit prefix exclusivity permit original-path update;
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4. any drift disables the space and requires reconcile plus explicit reopen.
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## Open decision: `data_operator` session ownership
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The product contract says a `data_operator` can view and operate only "their own"
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sessions, but the current identity model does not bind a user to a device, credential,
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mapping, or sync space. The management API therefore currently has only an
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organization boundary and cannot enforce personal ownership without a product choice.
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Do not enable the `data_operator` role in production until one of these models is
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selected and implemented:
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- **A — device owner (recommended):** an administrator assigns one or more users when
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approving a device; sessions inherit the device owner and only those users can
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operate them.
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- **B — space assignment:** administrators assign operators to sync spaces; every
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assigned operator can operate all sessions in those spaces.
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- **C — organization-wide operator:** keep the current organization-wide visibility
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and explicitly redefine "own" as "within the operator's organization".
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This decision also determines reassignment behavior, historical-session visibility,
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and whether multiple operators may own the same device.
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